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ABSTRACT
Good Faith Social Science and
the Activity of Inquiry
September 1978
Robert Christopher Knight, A.B., Occidental College
M.A., San Diego State Ihiversity
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Associate Professor Howard Gadlin
Good Faith Social Science and the Activity of
Inquiry is a theoretical discussion of the relationship
of social science to social action. It is argued that
the claim of empiricist social science that objective
knowledge may be accrued through proper scientific
methods is unfounded. Moreover, such claims serve to
obscure the inherent relationships that must exist
between a scientist and those who are the subject of
inquiry. The analysis focuses on the role of social
concepts as constituents of social reality and the
ways in which social scientific commerce in these con-
cepts must necessarily implicate scientists in the dual
role of participant-inquirer. This role places the in-
vestigator in the position of describing from a parti-
cular point of view, or social perspective.
V
Since the social scientific aspiration of accruing
objective facts is impossible, an alternative enterprise
is suggested. Good faith social science is proposed as
a more legitimate form of social participation. It is
proposed that the pursuit of theoretical self
-conscious-
ness must be included as a crucial criterion of rigorous
social science. Such self
-consciousness is seen to emerge
from the conflicts and discourse between those holding
discrepant social commitments and incompatible social
concepts. Such conflicts may not be argued in the arena
of empirical validity. These conflicts involve the in-
terests of those who are committed to different ways of
life. The disputes are inherently political. It is
argued then that for social scientists, rigorous empiri-
cal research, theoretical self -consciousness
,
political
dispute, and social responsibility tend to merge within
the perspective of good faith social science.
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INTRODUCTION
The last decade may be described as a period of
crisis in social psychology (Elms, 1975; Armistead, 1974).
I believe this crisis can be characterized fairly as
crisis of legitimacy and purpose. In the face of critici
from a variety of philosophical perspectives (e.g., inter-
subjective approaches, phenomenology, critical theory)
methods of inquiry and even the status of social science
as a "true science" are beginning to appear questionable.
These questions are being raised not only in the distant
philosophical literature but more recently in specific
critiques in the familiar journals of the scientific
specialties
.
Of course, criticism of the experimental method and
the empiricist model of inquiry did not originate in this
decade. And to be sure, many researchers in social psy-
chology and other social sciences have long operated in an
essentially positivist mode while holding considerable
misgivings about its limitations and even its legitimacy.
Nonetheless, when faced with philosophical critiques of
common empirical practices, those of us who consider our-
selves active researchers are often shaken but rarely
moved. While epistemological critiques may strike sym-
pathetic chords they do not often offer clear promise for
1
2alternative investigative activities to replace the well
established prescriptions of the empiricist model and
the experimental method.
I, like many of my colleagues, have found myself
no longer satisfied with classical methods of investiga-
tion. Hence the crisis. But enither have I found myself
drawn to alternative paradigms. For the substantive
researcher there are no alternative systematic paradigms
to rival the experimental method for prescription of
investigative activity and clear criteria of competency.
Such crises as we are experiencing are brought
about, at least partially, by effective criticism and
attack on the prevailing conceptions of legitimate activ-
ity and self-definition. However, such a crisis will
soon foster a reactionary response unless viable alter-
natives begin to develop. My concern is that substantive
researchers will not long suffer a paralyzing state of
crisis that does not allow continued empirical investiga-
tion with a sense of purpose and integrity. And unless
the epistemological criticism of the experimental method
is followed by the development of more concrete alternative
activities of inquiry, we will return to (or continue with)
research approaches that allow robust, if not completely
satisfying, pursuit of our scientific interest in sub-
stantive social questions.
3The following discussion will attempt to close the
gap between some critical epistemological literature and
the conduct of empirical investigations. I will attempt
to draw out the implications of interpretive (i.e., non-
positivist) models of inquiry for the substantive researcher.
I will address myself not only to our philosophical selves
but also to the part of us that longs to pursue basic re-
search, social curiosities, and pressing social issues with
intelligence, integrity and good faith.
I invite the reader to join me in reconsidering the
social scientific enterprise, from the broadest perspective.
I will examine alternately the criticisms of current re-
search practices in social psychology, the epistemological
foundations of American social science, and the activities
of conducting empirical research. I will cover a large
territory, gaining perspective, I hope, both from promon-
tory vistas and some focused close-ups. Necessarily, much
will be omitted. And, because it is my host discipline,
the preponderance of the discussion of social scientific
method will be considered within the context of social psy-
chology. Be that as it may, I am discussing here the
broad problematics of social inquiry and explanation, and
these problematics are endemic within all the social
sciences and their subfield specialties. I hope that
through the following very singular tour of our common
4concerns new insights will emerge that may in some way
contribute to a transformed profession of social science.
In the first section I will attempt to refocus
what I consider to be a rather confusing array of criti-
cism in the social sciences. We have, in fact, heard
an almost cacophonous racket of disgruntlement in the
past few years, informed and uninformed, revisionist and
radical. I will discuss the forms of these critiques as
they have emerged in the social psychological literature
(Chapter I), highlighting those elements which reject
the empiricist tradition and therefore suggest the most
challenging revision for the social scientific enterprise.
Chapter II will characterize an underlying epistemological
position that likewise abandons the empiricist perspective
and the pursuit of social "facts." I will argue that
social concepts are inherently contestable and that the
use of particular social concepts must implicate the user
in a set of social commitments that help consitute a
way of life. This epistemological position suggests the
foundation for an alternative more self-conscious and
rigorous practice of social science. I will propose new
aspirations and guides to the scientific way of life. I
will propose the development of a Good Faith Social Science
Chapter III redirects attention to the actual conduct
of empirical research. If the criticisms of current no-
tions in social science are to have any meaning then they
5must touch upon not only the more general philosophical-
theoretical concerns but also the activities of conducting
substantive inquiry. There is a rather substantial liter-
ature in social psychology which has been attempting to
reformulate or expand the repertoire of research strate-
gies in the "behavioral" sciences. The third chapter will
review this discussion, refocusing attention on the in-
evitable role of the researcher as actor and decision
maker in the research relationship.
In Chapter IV I will consider researcher actions
and decisions as defining and constraining researcher-
participant relationships. At the same time, these re-
lationships must constrain the range of possible empirical
results. I will argue that these relationships and the
behavioral regularities and empirical findings that emerge
from them are all implicated within social commitments
to particular ways of life. Therefore, empirically de-
rived social "facts" are limited by the socially con-
structed commitments within which they exist.
Finally, since social commitment and empirical re-
lationships are seen as internally related, self-consciousness
about these commitments will be viewed as a necessary
element of any social science that pretends to be rigorous
and explicit (Chapter V). Moreover, the pursuit of self-
consciousness and what I am calling Good Faith Social
Science will necessarily engage difficult issues concerning
6the legitimacy of social perspectives and social commit-
ments. Rigorous social science and concerns with social
responsibility will tend to merge. And insofar as this
is true, social scientists in good faith will face some
difficult issues in the arena of social responsibility,
that is, in the arena of politics.
CHAPTER I
CURRENT CRITICISM OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
EMPIRICISM, REVISIONS, AND REJECTIONS
American social psychology, perhaps more than some
other social sciences, may be noted for a strong orienta-
tion toward controlled experimental methods as a strategy
of research. This emphasis is easily discernable over a
variety of interest areas. Doctoral students' training
in social psychology is typically stronger in experimental
methods than it is in other alternative approaches. The
most prestigious journals reflect the same method values
in title and content. The Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology and The Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology both publish a preponderance of highly controlled
experiments (Kigbee and Wells, 1972). And even a cursory
reading of other APA journals reveals the same emphasis
(Gergen, 1975). Moreover, the preeminence of experimental
approaches is not limited to researchers pursuing ques-
tions in laboratory settings. The experimental paradigm
is often considered the most efficacious approach to social
evaluation (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell,
1975) as well as studies of setting effects on behavior in
7
8naturally occurring ecologies (e.g., Willems. 1977;
Tunnell, 1977).
A survey of recent criticisms of research methods in
social psychology reveals a mixed-bag of attacks on "the
experimental method," "laboratory techniques," and/or
the underlying assumptions of this "empiricist tradition."
Within the professional journals of the field however,
critiques most frequently focus on procedures, techniques,
and strategies without questioning the basic experimental
paradigm or the objectives of an empiricist social science.
It is much less common to read analyses of the experimental
approach which call into question the tenets of its episte-
mological foundation.
The distinction between revisionist proposals and
more thorough-going criticisms of empiricism have too often
been blurred and misapprehended. The differences are pro-
found, and any attempt to address the current malaise and
crisis in social science must first identify and distin-
guish between expressions of revisionist empiricism and
alternatives that suggest another epistemological perspec-
tive
.
Empiricism in Social Psychology
A short summary of basic elements of empiricism in
American social psychology will have the ring of familiar-
ity to almost all active researchers. However, we normally
9refer to these elements not as one philosophical position
but rather as the "foundations of the scientific endeavor."
If it can be said that there is a dominant paradigm
in social psychology, then its basic outlines certainly
reside in part within the epistemic perspectives and goals
of the enterprise. Underlying a variety of methods and
strategies of inquiry there are a limited number of shared
goals and assumptions that have allowed a certain unity to
social psychology as well as the other sciences of human
social interaction. To reject these shared perspectives,
it is thought, is to run the risk of placing oneself
outside the community of social science. A review of the
most prominent canons of this empiricist tradition will
serve to clarify the fundamental differences between pop-
ular revisionist proposals and the more thoroughgoing
critiques
.
The central concern of science is held to be the
establishment of geneval laws through systematic observa-
tion. Even the most superficial examination of the social
psychological literature fixes this objective as holding
paramount importance, no less than in the physical sciences
(DiRenzo, 1966; Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachy, 1966;
Jones and Gerard, 1969; Runkel and McGrath, 1972; Crano
and Brewer, 1973; Brandt, 1972; Manis, 1975; Thorngate,
1975). While "descriptive" research may be a legitimate
intermediate step in a program of study, the ultimate aim
ims
con-
10
of establishing general laws of human interaction rema:
In the end, social science seeks to establish stable
cepts and laws that will not change their meaning across
situations, times, cultures, etc. The principles of "at-
titude change," "social learning," "need- achievement ,
"
"internality-extemality,"
"undermanning-overmanning ,
"small group process," etc., may be thought to be incom-
plete, or even incorrect. But these are nonetheless con-
cepts, theories and models in pursuit of general laws of
social behavior.
It follows, that if we are searching for "general
laws" of human interaction then our criteria for empiric-
ally demonstrating such laws must include a moment of
prediction. The strong version of this criterion of
scientific inquiry states that complete explanation carries
predictive power. Because, unlike the physical sciences,
social interaction is always immersed in "open systems"
of influences social theories are not expected to perfectly
predict behavior. The social sciences have therefore
adopted the "probabilistic" or weaker version of the
criterion of prediction.
The arbiters of competing explanations (i.e., gen-
eral laws, or theories) are the emipivioal tests of their
predictions in the observable events which follow from
the theory. Theories are tested; predictions of observ-
able events are made. As a result of the process of pitting
11
competing explanations against each other, examining
their ability to predict a range of observable events,
inadequate theories are rejected or revised and more
adequate theories are retained. Through this manner of
testing, knowledge of the general laws of human inter-
action is said to accrue.
My objective here has not been to comprehensively
review the empiricist foundations of social psychologi-
cal inquiry. Rather, I have attempted only to remind
the reader of some of the most pervasive canons of this
philosophical position, those that have become virtually
synonymous with the conduct of social science. The point
then is to note some criteria from the empiricist concep-
tion of science that have become so much a part of the
social sciences that they often escape examination. In-
deed, we are often in danger of believing that the "pur-
suit of general laws," the criterion of "prediction,"
and "relative theoretical efficacy" define the activity
of true science. And to be sure, even some of the
severest critics of social psychological inquiry have
also assumed this empiricist perspective on science.
Methodological Revisions in
the Empiricist Tradition
There are a variety of familiar complaints and sug-
gested revisions for the common practices of experimental
social psychology. Most of these take the laboratory
12
experiment as their target for criticism and focus prim-
arily on technical-procedural issues. Experiments are
thought to be simple-mindedly limited to linear relation-
ships involving a minimum number of variables, while
social phenomena are complex and multifaceted. The
development of more sophisticated multivariate statistical
techniques is recommended (McGuire, 1973). Experimenter
artifacts haunt the endeavor with their potential biasing
effects: demand characteristics, evaluation apprehension,
etc. (Orne, 1962; Rosenberg, 1969; Gadlin and Ingle,
1975). Rigorous research, a code word for the experiment,
is seen as eliciting a type of reactance from subjects
resistant to the controlling atmosphere of experimental
procedures (Argyris, 1968). Attempts to predict social
behavior are thought to be doomed by the open textured
nature of the phenomena; each new circumstance adds higher
order interactions to analyses, befuddling attempts at
prediction and replication (Cronbach, 1975). Others argue
that social psychologists have given insufficient atten-
tion to the centrality of social meanings in shaping social
behavior. Indeed, a number of these authors contend that
social scientists will not develop any systematic knowledge
about social behavior until phenomenological realities,
meanings, and rules are more adequately included in
scientific research (e.g., Harre and Secord, 1972;
Bronfenbrenner
,
1974, 1977).
13
All other criticisms aside, however, the major
thrust of dissatisfaction with the laboratory experi-
mental method has concerned its "artificiality" or as
some have called it. its lack of "ecological validity."
Perhaps the best known for their position on the essen-
tial importance of research "in situ" have been the
ecological psychologists (e.g.. Barker. 1965. 1968, 1969;
Willems, 1969; Wright, 1967; Gump and Kounin, 1960).
Along with others, they argue that an understanding of the
behavior patterns of individuals and groups cannot arise
from collecting data that is wrenched from natural con-
texts and "behavior settings." The context is viewed as
an essential part of the phenomena of social behavior.
There is a call for greater documentation of the distri-
bution of phenomena in nature, in the "investigator-free"
environment (Willems, 1969, 1977; Elms, 1975; Sells, 1974).
If they are not shunned completely as impediments to the
lawful explanation of human behavior manipulation and
control, as the hallmarks of the laboratory experiment,
are looked upon with suspicion (Bass, 1974; Brandt, 1972;
Gump and Kounin, I960; Willems, 1969, 1977).
Those authors listed above, and others (e.g.,
Bronfenbrenner, 1974, 1977; Feldman. Hass, and Wilbur.
1970; Fredrickson, 1972), have certainly contributed
measurably to widening the perspectives of social psychol-
ogists insensitive to the role of social and physical
14
contexts in social behavior. They may even have contri-
buted to some of the uneasiness we feel about our em-
pirical work. Be that as it may, it would appear that
the empiricist goal of general laws, and the development
of objective knowledge through prediction tests and
theoretical competition remain for many unchanged. A
few sample quotations from prominent critics may illus-
trate this point.
.
.
.behavior is largely aontvolled by
the environmental setting in which it
occurs and,
. . .changing the environ-
mental setting will result in changes
in behavior. (Willems, 1977, p. 51)
(Behavioral ecology) will provide oompve-
hensive^ progressive, and cumulative
information on ecobehavioral systems—
homes, schools, and many other institutions
and settings. (Willems, 1977, p. 64)
Until we can assign to environmental
variables the proportions of variance in
behavior for which they account, our
understanding of behavior will be incom-
plete. (Sells, 1969, p. 26)
.
.
.investigators that have combined the
three dimensions (of naturalistic research)
have accrued at least three advantages:
(a) New empirical laws have been discovered,
(b) the research has been made more credible
to participants, thereby increasing internal
validity, and (c) the research has been
given greater external validity
,
a valued
asset in a discipline supposedly concerned
with real-world events. (Tunnell, 1977,
p. 426)
In the first instance we shall be trying to
devise a system of concepts for understanding
social interactions and to check this system
against reality. It may be that after gener-
ations of human ethogenists have studied the
15
lives of men women, and children, they maycome to see that certain very subtle patterns
Laws. But though our methodology cannot
assume this, it must be such that it may ul-
^in^i^^ ^^^fo^? ^/ laws. (Harreand Secord, 1972, p. 129)
[in all quotations, emphasis is mine]
The preceding summary of empiricist currents in
social psychology should be noncontroversial to most ob-
servers as well as participants in the field. It does
not take a cracker-jack investigative reporter to discern
that the overriding goal of most social scientists is to
discover general laws through empirical testing. It is,
in fact, no more than a reaffirmation to find that well-
known critics of current empirical methods share this
objective and its underlying epistemological perspectives.
Critiques of Empiricism in
Social Fsychology
In recent years some scholars have taken a much
deeper critical view of theory and research in social
psychology. Informed by critics of empiricism in both
the philosophical and sociological literature, they have
cast doubt on the basic tenets underlying research activ-
ities and theory building. These forms of argument ques-
tion the most basic propositions of the empiricist per-
spective: (1) that the rigors of systematic observation,
predictive criteria, and theory testing may achieve the
detached objectivity required for discovering general laws
16
of social behavior, and (2) social phenomena are stable
and transhistorical and therefore appropriately describ-
able by general laws. The bottom line contention is
that the social sciences do not and cannot assume a de-
tached perspecitve on social phenomena. As social
scientists, as social beings ourselves, we are intimately
intertwined in the social world we pretend to dispassion-
ately describe. The social scientist, the profession of
social science, the society, and the description of
abstracted social phenomena mutually constitute each
other. Denial of this relationship in assuming the em-
piricist perspective is then seen as a major impediment
to the understanding of human social actions.
For social psychologists the most familiar example
of such relational critiques may be the often cited
article by Kenneth Gergen (1973), "Social Psychology as
History." Social behavior patterns that have been theo-
retically characterized as, for example, "the authori-
tarian personality," "conformity," "affiliation," or
"social comparison" were seen as primarily historical
phenomena rather than basic psychological processed. As
historical periods, cultures, and subcultures change these
phenomena would also be altered. In this way it was
claimed that "while methods of research are scientific
in character, theories of social behavior are primarily
17
reflections of contemporary history"! (p. 309). Gergen
takes the position that social behavior and social mean-
ing arise out of social relationships embedded in cultural-
historical contexts.
The primary concern for us here, is the relation-
ship between the scientific community and the society.
Not only are the phenomena of social scientific study
seen as historically transient, but, according to Gergen,
the social scientist is implicated as a moving force in
this process. Not only do we study behavior, isolate con-
cepts, and describe lawful relationships, we also make
these analyses available (albeit indirectly) to those we
have observed. There is a kind of feedback loop between
social science and society. Concepts such as "authoritar-
ian behavior," "dogmatism," or "reinforcement" seep into
the folk culture through such outlets as Psychology Today
or the paperback book trade. This may happen despite the
best efforts at abstruse jargon and technical language.
Based on common values of freedom and individuality, people
are resistant to seeing themselves as predictable in the
way theoretical positions depict them. And knowledge of
this social psychological theory then becomes an oppor-
tunity for liberating oneself from that predictable
^Gergen (1973) has been criticized for basing his
arguments on superficial phenomena and ignoring truly
transhistorical and abstract "process models" of social
behavior (Schlenker, 1974; Manis, 1975). For counter ar-
guments to this "historical variability" but "process
invariance" argument see Gergen (1976), Hendricks (1974),
and Thorngate (1975).
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pattern of behavior. This is especially true, in Gergen's
view, since so many theories are prescriptive. We prefer
to be "unauthoritarian." certainly not "conforming," or
susceptable to every manipulative attempt to "change our
attitudes.
"
As a general surmise, sophistication as topsychological principles liberates one fromtheir behavioral implications. Establishedprinciples of behavior become inputs into
one s decision making. As Winch (1959)has pointed out, "Since understanding
something involves understanding its con-
tradiction, someone who, with understanding
performs X must be capable of envisioning
the possibility of doing not X" (p. 89)Psychological principles also sensitize
one to
_ influences acting on him and draw
attention to certain aspects of the environ-
ment and himself. In doing so, one's
patterns of behavior may be strongly in-
fluenced. (Gergen, 1973, p. 313)
I would not like to dwell too much on Gergen's
introduction of the relational problems of an empiricist
pursuit of general laws. Indeed, social scientific theory
may so effect society as to be the impetus for its own
invalidation. And as Gergen ironically points out, the
most suitable protection against such eventualities might
be a more active concealment of scientific findings.
.
.
.science could be removed from the
public domain and scientific understand-
ing reserved for a select elite. (p. 314)
But Gergen has only addressed a portion of the relational
critique of empiricist aspirations. If social science is
so immersed in society that its theory may alter current
19
historical patterns of behavior
, then we must consider
that current and local history may also help constitute
the questions, perspectives, and general laws of the
science
,
Observing that social science and society are
mutually constitutive or, as here, noting the influence
of cultural history on scientific concepts and "general
laws" is much more than accusation of failure to be
"value-neutral." Gergen's observation that many social
psychological concepts contain "prescriptive bias" (e.g.,
authoritarian-nonauthoritarian) is one familiar version
of this accusation that the social scientist often indulges
his/her value commitments in "describing" concepts. But
these values are surface phenomena, easily discerned and
articulated, and indeed, by Gergen's argument, consciously
normative to the extent that public (non-scientific)
knowledge of the behavioral indices of say "authoritar-
ianess" or "conformity" leads to widespread avoidance of
these behaviors. So the argument goes, given a moral
dimension within the phenomena under study social scien-
tists cannot observe objectively but inevitably tilt to
one moral alternative or the other.
To suggest that social science and society mutually
constitute each other through their concepts and perspec-
tives is to raise a much more serious criticism. Some
have argued that both social science and society are formed
20
and understood within the same systematic body of con-
cepts and a particular manner of thinking. For example,
a recent article by Edward Sampson, "Psychology and the
American Ideal" (1977), reviewed the cultural and his-
torical ideology of "self-sufficient individualism" and
its penetration of such theoretical models as androgyny,
mental health and moral development, equity theory, the
teacher-scholar model, and encounter group research. In
noting the relationship of an American ideology of
individualism in forming current conceptions of androgyny
(which emerges as a rather super- individual) to replace
"less healthy" masculine or feminine sex roles, Sampson
illustrated some of the contradictions of an empiricist
perspective.
It seems that we have adoped only one
form of synthesis as the preferred mode,
in part because we are blinded by our own
cultural heritage and have difficulty in
seeing its impact on our formulations
,
in part because we have few theories or
methods that direct us toward alternative
formulations. What I am saying, therefore,
is that within an individualistic histor-
ical and cultural ethos, the self-
contained individual, the androgynous type
for example, is the ideal. In an alter-
native system, however, that same char-
acter is neither ideal nor perhaps de-
sirable. Androgyny as a sign of good
health thereby reflects an individual-
istic social arrangement in which persons
wish to be self-contained and self-
sufficient in order to be successful,
(p. 774)
In this connection, it is important to
note that I am not disputing the research
findings involving androg3niy and self-
esteem and androgjmy and improved
21
adaptability. I am attempting to locate
anf^.nl'^^'T" ^^^^^ P^°P^^ historicald cultural context and view them therebyas syntheses that are uniquely suited toour contemporary individualistic and self-contained ideal.
Likewise, by placing the concept ofandrogyny within its historical and cul-tural setting
,
we can see that androgyny
IS neither a necessary, an inevitable
nor a fundamentally more desirable psy-
chological quality. (Sampson, 1977, p. 774)
These comments illustrate several disturbing themes
for the scientist pursuing general laws through empirical
theory testing. Social psychology, and social scientists,
are so immersed in cultural ideologies (such as self-
sufficient individualism as an ideal type) that the con-
ceivable "descriptive" concepts even alternative and
competing concepts (e.g., masculine-feminine sex roles in
America vs. androgyny), tend to be tightly bounded and
restricted. Moreover, theoretical tests of say "the adapt-
ability of androg3mous sex roles" are empirically self-
confirming within a cultural ethos and social structure
that support the individualist ideal. I might add, if it
is not already obvious, that a belief that general laws
are confirmed through these "tests" of empirical prediction
simply adds to the invisibility of the underlying cultural
perspectives and social structures that predispose the
results
.
Other social scientists have also criticized the
field for inattention to the relationship of scientific
22
concepts with the larger society, culture and subcultural
ideologies and even the local interactions within the
research activity itself (e.g.. Buss, 1975; Bronfenbrenner
,
1977). Sigmund Koch, for example, reconsidering what
he had learned in his classic work Psychology: A Study
of a Science (1959, 1962, 1962) has commented.
.
.it should be emphasized that
paradigms." theories, models (or
whatever one's label for conceptual
ordering devices) can never prove pre-
emptive or preclusive of alternative
organizations. That is so for any
field of inquiry, but conspicuously
so in relation to the psychological
and social studies. The presumption
on the part of their promulgators that
the gappy, sensibility-dependent, and
often arbitrary paradigms of psychology
do encapsulate pre-emptive truths is
no mere cognitive blunder. Nor can itbe written off as an innocuous excess
of enthusiasm. It raises a grave moral
issue reflective of a widespread moral
bankruptcy within psychology. In the
psychological studies, the attribution
to any paradigm of a pre-emptive final-
ity has the force of telling human beings
precisely what they are, of fixing their
essence, defining their ultimate worth,
potential, meaning; cauterizing away
that quality of ambiguity, mystery,
search, that makes progress through a
biography an adventure. (Koch, 1977
p. 5-6)
The mutually constitutive relationship of social
science with the social phenomena of its interest has been
analyzed not only at the broad level of science and society,
concepts and ideology, but also within the local inter-
actions of the researcher and those being researcher. In
two related papers Gadlin and Ingle (1975) and Ingle (1977)
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have reconsidered the experimental paradigm in social
psychology in terms of its underlying
"objectivist"
(read empiricist) perspective and consequent failure to
consider the relational character of the experimenter-
subject encounter. Interestingly, they find that social
psychologist have rarely utilized social psychological
findings to gain understanding of the social psychology
experiment. An examination of recent literature revealed
some instructive and disturbing findings that cast doubt
on the possibility of constructing a social science of
general laws independent of the relationship of the
scientist/researcher with his/her "subjects." Assuming
the role of the dispassionate empiricist, social experi-
menters have become unaware of their own role in the
empirical findings which they generate. Looking at the
social behavior of others, social psychologsits have found
that: (1) the presence of a potentially evaluative audi-
ence systematically alters persons' task performance,
(2) when attributing the causes of events actors tend to
see these as more often residing in the social or physical
environment while observers attribute causes to internal
actor dispositions, and (3) in assymetrical power rela-
tionships (physical, expert, or social power) the parti-
cipants act out their roles through social power self-
presentation and ingratiation, respectively. It takes
very little reflection to recognize the relevance of these
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social relationship phenomena for the encounter of the
social scientist with his/her experimental
"subjects."
While their arguments focused largely on the particular
relationship of the social psychological experimenter
to his/her subjects, it is clear that we cannot escape
this relational critique merely by leaving the laboratory
setting or pursuing unobstrusiveness in our observations.
•
.
.any attempt to describe the ideal
research relationship would be.
. short-
sighted— all research relationships im-pose their own unique set of limitations
upon the knowledge which they eventually
produce. Thus, the question of an appro-priate research relationship is asked
prematurely if questions of content andthe uses of that content are not adequately
addressed first. (Ingle, 1977, p. 87)
We are suggesting that we abandon what
we consider a futile attempt to control,
inhibit, or deny the relational aspect
of research. Rather, we suggest that
the relational quality of research be
attended to; that it be developed and
^nvestigated. (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
The authors suggest that advances in social psychological
research will depend in part on our,
.
.
.acknowledging that the study of
human behavior necessarily includes the
behavior of psychologists. This recog-
nition implies, of course, that the
psychologist is as prone to psychological
processes as anyone else, and should be
especially self-conscious of this fact
when acting as a scientist. This self-
consciousness includes the psychologist's
awareness of his relation to and with
his subject matter, and the awareness of
his own role with respect to inquiry.
The knowledge that derives from such
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Current Criticism and the
Conduct ot Social S"ETinrP
Criticisms such as those discussed above, criticisms
which question basic aspirations and procedures, have made
very few inroads into the actual conduct of inquiry in
social science. Of course, many if not most, social sci-
entists are familiar with the criticisms sporadically ap-
pearing in the literature. And many of us are at least
partially aware of the robust literature in the philosophi-
cal disciplines that is questioning empiricist perspectives
and developing alternative views of science. If these
positions are found to be interesting, then they are too
often interesting as mere intellectual curiosities. If
the criticism is disturbing, this disturbance is an under-
current that wells up small whirlpools of doubt but does
not significantly change the current of the empiricist
stream. The crisis in social psychology and other social
sciences is played out in occasional critical articles,
small and isolated pockets of deviant scientists, and in
the silent and personal doubts of mainstream researchers.
Perhaps this is, if you will, normal for a crisis.
Following the analysis of Thomas Kuhn (The Structure
of Saientifia Revolutions
,
1962), I would agree that old
paradigms are replaced by more promising paradigms rather
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abandoned in the face of criticism. And I believe such
an analysis takes us some distance in understanding the
tenacity of the empiricist perspective in theface of
recent criticism. The great majority of social sci-
entists are very practical-minded men and women intent
on pursuing substantive questions. The empiricist tradi-
tion has allowed them a robust perspective and procedure
within which to indulge their desires to answer these
nagging questions about social behavior. Philosophical
criticism or general critiques within the social sciences
may raise doubts. But the empiricist perspective will
not be abandoned without a clearer promise for an alter-
native paradigm.
In the succeeding chapters, I would like to offer
an analysis of scientific activities that may move us
beyond the more general or philosophical criticism toward
an alternative empirical social science without empiricism.
I will argue that the presumptions and tenets of philo-
sophical empiricism are demonstrably untenable. That is
not to say that systematic observation has no place in
social science. I do not wish to dispute the centrality
of empirical research for a legitimate social science.
I do dispute the empiricist conception of empirical
activity and empirical aspirations. Empiricism places
systematic observation within a value-free enterprise,
objectively establishing "basic knowledge," and "facts."
27
I will argue that this empiricist enterprise grossly mis-
apprehends the relationship between the empirical re-
search of social scientists and the social phenomena under
investigation. In making this argument I will attempt
to address two broad issues: (1) translating epistemologi-
cal critiques of empiricism into the familiar problematics
we face in considering strategies of inquiry and, (2)
analyzing the deep implications of a non-empiricist per-
spective, a new way of life for the social scientist.
I will begin this analysis by first stepping back to
reconsider some discussions from the epistemological
literature. It is true that the criticisms that have
appeared in the social sciences are informed by or have
derived from the more basic philsophical discourse. But
they are not of the same form or logic. I believe the
translations from this literature by social scientists
have not always captured the full importance and perti-
nence of the philosophical discussions. Therefore, I will
briefly characterize my reading of epistemological liter-
ature that has focused criticism on empiricist suppositions.
I will argue that social scientists oannot detach
themselves from the social concepts that are the subject
of inquiry. I will argue that social concepts are not
just phenomena (located out there in the world)
;
they are
social commitments that can and do change. They are social
commitments that help constitute a way of life. From this
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discussion I will suggest an alternative epistemological
base for the conduct of inquiry. This then will set the
stage for considering the implications of such an alter-
native for the way of life we have come to call social
science
.
CHAPTER II
GOOD FAITH SOCIAL SCIENCE
The world is for us what is presented
through our concepts. That is not to
say that our concepts may not change-
but when they do, that means that our
concept of the world has changed too(Winch, 1958, p. 15)
Making sense of the world and the use of social
concepts in doing so is, of course, not a uniquely
scientific activity. It is at the heart of human social
existence, l^mo are kinsmen? VJhat is a mistake? What
kinds of activities speak of intelligence or insanity?
I>niat is a cause? "The world is for us what is presented
through our concepts." For social science no less than
for other realms of social life the process of forming
concepts lies at the very heart of all our undertakings.
And if we are to understand the dimensions of our social
existence we must come to grips with this process of
conceptualization which helps constitute our reality.
I would like to argue that social scientists are necessav-
ily active agents in the social construction of reality.
Moreover, this participant relationship is precisely what
the empiricist tradition denies and therefore obscures.
A Good Faith Social Science must place self -consciousness
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and explicitness about scientists' social participation
at the center of the enterprise.
Social science is, of course, in a special position
with respect to social concepts. Everyone participates
in the construction of social reality. However, as social
scientists we are not only social participants, but at the
same time we are engaged in the profession of social ex-
planation. Social explanation is the raison d'entre of
the social scientific profession. We have taken social
concepts as our coin. We are, in a sense, merchants in
conceptual reality. But concepts then become both the
currency of our world and the products of our enterprise.
We are at the same time participants in the making and
brokers in the exchange. And our most serious challenges
are to avoid inadvertently brokering in counterfeit con-
cepts. If we are to trade in social concepts and explan-
ations, if we presume to be social scientists, then we
must come to grips with this inherent com^plicity.
Attention has too long been diverted from the basic
social scientific problematic of concept formation. The
statistical and experimental technology for manipulating
observed and conceptualized phenomena has been developing
at a staggering rate. Scientists have become dazzled and
enchanted by their o\<fn mechanical handywork
. In this
state of entrancement , scientists have lost touch with
their attachments and intimacy with the theoretical con-
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cepts that have been reduced to mere objects and mani-
pulanda.
Before we can consider the methods and strategies
of inquiry we must reconsider our relationship to the
substance of our investigations. We must reexamine the
scientific problematic of description and characteriza-
tion. We must rediscover our relationships within the
social experience of conceptualizing and ordering the
phenomenal world. This chapter will attempt to re-place
social scientific activities within the social fabric.
I will further argue that with the realization of social
attachments must come a reorientation to the tasks of
social science. The pretensions of empiricist detach-
ment are untenable. We must begin to develop a social
science that not only recognizes its embededness in social
relationships but also its obligations to participate in
good faith.
Describing From a Normative
Point of View
Borrowing an analogy (Connolly, 1974), it may be
said that the connection between the substance of empir-
ically verified "facts" and the terms and concepts of
theoretical formulation are comparable in some respects
2
to the relationship of a jury to a legal system.
2
The discussions of "describing from a point of
view," "describing from a moral point of view," and
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The jury examines the evidence and
reaches a verdict, but prior to its
"^li^^^^f^io^s, the judge, acting as
official interpreter of the law, chargesthe jury with a set of responsibilities
establishes what can be considered as
'
evidence, and specifies what constitutes
a punishable offense. If, for instance
the jury is to decide whether the defen-dant negligently caused or contributed toinjuries received by the plaintiff thejudge instructs the jury as to what sort
of conduct legally constitute "negligence"
and contributory negligence", he alsoinforms the jury where the burden of proof
rests and screens claims from it, such ashearsay" testimony, that are not legally
admissible as evidence. In charging thejury and in regulating the presentation
of evidence to it, the judge, we might
say, specifies the terms within which thejury considers evidence and reaches a
verdict. (p. 2)
It is my position that empirical conclusions are nec-
essarily defined and limited by the dimensions of their
constituent theoretical terms and concepts. Our con-
cepts dictate the domain and structure of the "reality"
to be observed and measured. Alternative conceptions
may constitute the phenomenal world into incommensurate
realities. And if this is true, then the empiricist
contention that competing theoretical conceptions may
be empirically compared and tested for their "truth"
potential is without foundation. It is a contention
that requires a singular reality and conceptual domain
"essentially contested concepts" are indebted to
William E. Connolly's analyses of these issues in
The Terms of Political Discourse (1974) and some
personal communications (1977) . My presentations
of these issues are essentially the same as Connolly's.
33
as foundation for its empirical arbitration.
Inr.P^^-''^^\^ situation is not to namesomething, but to characterize it Thus
qLf^'V-i^^^^M^^^^^S when we say'"Empir4State Building" or "Jim", we are when wesay that the building is very tall and
made of grey concrete or that Jim is aquiet, intense person who is quite indus-trious It is the tendency to think ofdescribing as if it were the same thins
as naming that accounts for so many com-
mentators ignoring a fundamental feature
of description: A description does not
refer to data or elements that are boundtogether merely on the basis of similarities
adhering m them, but to describe is to
characterize a situation from the vantagepoint of certain interests, purposes or
standards. Connolly, 1974, pp. 22-23)
The proposition that to describe is to charac-
terize from one or more points of view would seem an
innocent enough observation. Consider some examples.
The definition of a chair is indeed contained in its
purpose. A chair may take on a variety of shapes,
textures, and styles; but an object is a chair from
the point of view of its "sitableness . " Indeed, a
broad assortment of objects may be used for this purpose.
And any number of objects may become chairs or benches,
but only when they are seen as "sitable" objects. Unruly
weeds become herbs only when we discover their properties
of taste, or medicines when they are believed to have
curative uses. When terms such as "dangerous," "fearful,"
or "menacing" are used to describe persons or settings
they are used to call attention to features which may be
harmful to participants. These terms do not "name" a
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reality, they orient the listener to certain charac-
teristics; and these characterizations serve the pur-
pose of issuing a warning.
Beyond describing from a point of view, the terms
and concepts of human discourse are often dese.i^tions
from a moral or normative point of view. And this is
especially true as we go beyond physical objects to
consider personal and social characterizations. Genocide,
racism, aggression, altruism, intelligence, and personal
control are all terms which describe from an evaluative
and normative point of view, or they are in the words of
Julius Kovesi (1967) "moral notions." Such concepts are
moral notions in that while certain specified conditions
must be met before the concepts may be applied, these
concepts are also to a large extent constituted by their
appraisive or evaluative meaning.
A term such as aggression may be applied to a very
wide range of human activities. There are, to be sure,
some socially established limiting conditions for its
application. It is a description from a moral point
of view not in the sense that to say someone was aggressive
is always to say they were wrong, but rather in the sense
that the concept would not be formed unless there was
some point in doing so--unless we shared a moral point
of view that this concept concretizes and reflects. Any
act that may be described as aggressive must also appear
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liable to moral injunctions. In the same way that
candidates for the term chair must have certain charac-
teristics which allow sitting (a reasonably flat hori-
zontal surface, for instance), actions which may be
characterized as aggressive must have some attributes
which could lead us to condemn the agent. In this way
the criteria and the moral point of a concept are dia-
lectically related; it is from the point of view of the
kind of conduct which we consider unacceptable that the
concept "aggression" is formed. And it is only if the
acts meet these criteria that we have reason to accuse
the agent of being aggressive.
Moral or normative notions, concepts which describe
from a moral point of view, may vary in their level of
completeness (Kovesi, 1967; Connolly, 1974). Murder, for
example, is a relatively complete moral notion. Inten-
tionally taking the life of another for personal advantage
3
Some might suggest that behavioral operationali-
zation could be used to avoid the normative elements of
common language concepts such as "aggression". But it
is clear that this strategy cannot succeed in avoiding
the normative dimensions of a concept without at the same
time fundamentally changing its meaning. The elements
of any operational definition must either reflect the
moral point of the concept, or on the other hand, adopt
definitional elements that alter its existing normative
point, or seek a level of abstraction that dismembers
the concept by wrenching all moral perspective from it.
That is, the would be "neutral observer" must adopt the
prevailing normative contours and behavioral criteria
of a concept or unilaterally and arbitrarily change the
perspective. In the latter case the scientist is of course
dealing with a concept without social connection or social
meaning
.
ese
constitutes adequate reason for condemnation. Ther
is indeed little room for the "good murder." Of cour
other concepts share this characteristic of relative
moral completeness. The absurdity of violating the
moral point of such concepts may serve as the best
illustration. What could one possibly mean by the
terms "ethical genocide" or "justifiable racism." But
other concepts that describe from a moral point of
view are relatively incomplete. While there is a moral
point which helps constitute the term, there is room
for extenuating circumstances or special conditions.
Actions which are taken with the intent of harming or
thwarting another person are aggressive; such actions
are inherently suspect or at the very least liable to
condemnation. However, aggression is an incomplete
moral notion because there are special situations in
which it is acceptable or circumstances which allow
dispensation from its moral sanctions (e.g., aggressive
football player, aggressive businessman, aggression
in self-defense). Nonetheless, such a concept does
have a moral point, and we cannot violate this point
without special justification or the term is in danger
of losing its sense altogether.
Many other concepts, familiar to the social
sciences, may be characterized as incomplete moral
notions. Such concepts as self-sufficiency, personal
control, individuation, assertiveness
.
responsibility,
and altruism range in their completeness but are all.
nonetheless, concepts which describe from a normative
or moral point of view. That the moral point of these
terms does not constrain their uses as forcefully as
concepts such as good, genocide, or murder can be
conceded. We may not say. "yes. it was genocide, but
was it justifiable genocide," without violating the
moral point of "genocide" as a concept. We are, in
making such a statement, liable to being accused of
totally misconstruing the term. With an incomplete
moral notion such as self-sufficiency we are also con-
strained by the point of the term. We may say, "isn't
it a shame how he has become so self-sufficient." but
if we do then the burden of proof is upon us to defend
this use of the term. We have violated its moral point
An argument could be made for the negative implications
of self-sufficiency in this particular case, "but for
those sharing the concept, it embodies a standard to
be applied unless so defeated" (Connolly. 1974. p. 31)
If in particular instances we may violate the
point of view embodied in a concept, we may not do so
as a matter of course. To change the moral point of a
concept is to fundamentally change its meaning, and to
subtract the moral point of view completely is to
render the concept empty and without sense. Such a
concept will fall into disuse. This has been the fate
of such terms as "spinster," "saving yourself for mar-
riage," "patriarch," "man of the house," "negro," and
others. Our society has changed in some ways, and the
moral points of view which once helped constitute these
terms have either changed or were lost; and with this
these concepts have radically altered their meaning
or have disappeared from common usage altogether.
Essentially Contestable Concepts
All concepts are descriptions from a point of view
and often from a moral or normative point of view. More-
over, within a complex and changing social fabric the
criteria for applying concepts to concrete events may
be unclear and disputable. Concepts such as "intimacy,"
"achievement," "competence," "personal control" and "re-
sponsibility" must undergo almost constant adjustments
in their criteria for application as new and unforeseen
situations arise. And as new criteria arise and estab-
lished criteria change so do the dimensions of meaning
that help constitute the concept. Intimacy does not
mean today what it did 100 years ago (Gadlin, 1977),
although it still maintains its moral point. New situa-
tions and circumstances have interceded which required
social adjustments in our way of life and our concept
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of what it is to have a close relationship.
Although many concepts change and some even dis-
appear, not all concepts are contestable. Following the
analyses of W.B. Gallie (1956) and William Connolly (1974.
p. 10), certain conditions must be met before a concept
IS contestable.
1. The concept must have a moral point. It must
describe a valued or devalued achievement.
2. The concept or practice involved must be in-
ternally complex. That is, its characteriza-
tion must involve reference to several dimen-
sions
.
3. The criteria for applying the concept must
be relatively open enabling the parties to
integrate even shared rules differently as
new and unforeseen situations arise.
The related concepts of womanhood, "feminine,"
and "femininity" are both contestable and contested in
contemporary America. Womanhood is a valued achievement
by all the contesting parties. It is an internally
complex concept with constituent dimensions and criteria
of application which are themselves disputable (e.g..
1+
These two authors discussed "essentially con-
tested concepts" within the context of political science
I have changed the perspective to one of "potential con-
testability" in order to adapt this idea to a broader
arena of social science.
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self-respect, achievement, equality, justice, motherhood,
demeanor, etc.). The debate over the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, for example, may be viewed as a contest over the
relationship of equality to justice and full womanhood.
Those opposing ERA have argued that legal equality will
undermine
-justice" for women as they conceive them. Con-
flict over the rights of women to equal pay for equal work
is a contest about the concept of an "achieving woman"
and whether the work world will be considered an appropriate
arena, requiring equal protection under the law. The con-
ceptual landscape is changing, and the emerging "new woman-
hood" represents an entirely new social phenomenon, re-
shaping relationships and creating its own dynamic of
change with every other element of social life.
Other concepts have been contested and expanded in
recent years: intelligence, racism, and institutional
racism, for example. But perhaps of more interest here
are contestable concepts that have not been raised to
the level of public dispute. These are concepts of moral-
normative importance. They are internally complex. And
alternative formulations of these notions are not only
possible but evident in isolated subcultures, deviant
subpopulations
, and some scholarly analyses. This issue
becomes critically important as we realize that it is
the relative stability of some social concepts which has
made them appear "natural," immutable, and transhis torical
.
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It is such a misconstrual of social phenomena which
allows researchers and theoreticions to apply the tools
of empirical natural sciences. Understanding social
concepts as fixed, allows us to treat them as stable
objects. And, in the end, this empiricist objectifica-
tion reinforces the conceptual status quo for those
phenomena
.
Social concepts with moral or evaluative rele-
vance are social concepts with real human consequences.
They help constitute a way of life. They are essentially
contestable. Such moral concepts may only avoid social
dispute to the extent that they remain invisible or im-
mutable, and are viewed as part of the "natural order"
rather than the social order. Their evaluative nature
creates the moving force for competing self-interests
to dispute the criteria of application or even the moral
perspective itself. But such social disputation may only
occur when the different perspectives and interests can
come to a point of mutually recognized contradiction.
Families, intimate friends and lovers, for example,
inevitably contain within them myths, customs and forms
of interaction which have evaluative or moral significance
The acceptable means of exhibiting affection, anger, sex-
uality, etc., may be established within these small and
bounded relationships. If they are indeed segregated
from wider societal intrusions they may contain dimensions
that are quite idiosyncratic. In a society that does
not engage in open discussion of intimacy and sexuality,
for example, contradictory myths and conceptions may
be generated within this privacy and isolation. There
is little opportunity for these private moral concepts
to come into recognized contradiction with other perspec-
tives. They may remain uncontested concepts. It is
only as these domains receive public light that social
and personal contradictions may be addressed and moral
concepts disputed.
Those social concepts which most thoroughly per-
meate a society are perhaps the most difficult to dis-
cern. Their very ubiquitousness within the domains of
social intercourse, individual aspiration and institu-
tional structures creates their appearance as part of
the natural order. Sampson's analysis (1977) of the
interpenetration of "self-sufficient individualism" and
social scientific theory is, of course, illustrative
of just such a concept in the American social order.
Self-sufficiency, personal control, and individualism
are constitutive of our American ideal and are therefore
the foundation for the ordering of other concepts which
define the ideals of our way of life. We dispute the
dimensions of mental health but not the centrality of
self-sufficiency at the core of the considered alter-
natives. Sex role complementarity pales next to the
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competency and independence of an androgynous alter-
native. In environmental psychology notions of personal
control create the theoretical order for evaluating the
adequacy of built environments for human use (Knight,
Zimring, and Kent, 1976; Altman, 1975; Baron and Mandel,
1975)
.
Quite "naturally" concepts of "privacy" dominate
the theoretical and empirical literature. These concepts
have intuitive appeal; that is the measure of their con-
gruence with prevailing social conceptions. And, of
course, to the extent that we discipline these theories
to closely reflect underlying social ideals and manage
our research to select "appropriate tests," "empirical
verification" will be forthcoming.
Of course, no social order is simple and monothem-
atic. Even concepts as ubiquitious as self-sufficient
individualism are not universally endorsed. A moment's
consideration will bring to mind a variety of social
arrangements inconsistent with this ideal (e.g., communal
and Utopian communities, cooperative houses and apartments,
etc.). But such arrangements are socially deviant, in
some cases illegal (e.g., zoning laws often prohibit
cooperative housing)
, and always faced with difficulties
both from within and without. The society is so structured
as to enforce the atomization of individuals and coopera-
tive groups are always challenged by the members' own
difficulty with relinquishing individualistically defined
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aspirations, needs, and desires. Cooperatives in
America are notoriously short lived.
Contestable concepts, especially those that
constitute deep and pervasive commitments within a
social order, may overpower the abilities of those
who would dispute them. The communal and cooperative
movement has had many false starts in the face of an
American individualistic and competitive social struc-
ture and ethos. The aspirations of women did not change
suddenly to form the modern feminist movement. History
is filled with instances of women organizing for change
as in the British and American suffragist movements.
But when isolated women have attempted to push the
boundaries of the prevailing conception of womanhood
they often suffered personal doubts, frustrations and
failure. Whatever the accomplishments of a person such
as George Sand, for example, the image of women in 19th
century France did not undergo the fundamental trans-
formations that would allow for the routine acceptance
of literary genius such as hers. When social concepts
are widely held and especially when they appear to define
"the natural order," these contestable concepts may not
surface as true social dispute. When the social structure
labels and isolates deviants, the prerogative of naming
the reality is with the powerful. Prevailing concepts
of the poor and unemployed (cf. Ryan, 1972), marijuana
users in the 1950's (cf. Becker. 1963). or any other
relatively powerless and isolated group, may be con-
testable. But their position in society will preclude
anything that could meaningfully be considered social
dispute. Under such conditions the concepts of the
"lazy and shiftless poor" and the "perverted hop-head"
may persist as realities; deviant opinions will remain
just that and no more.
The concepts we use in contruing and constituting
the world are at the center of our social existence.
Moreover, normative and moral notions embody the force
of value, aspiration, sanction, and condemnation. Their
dimensions and criteria of application help define the
shape of the human spirit and the constraints of a social
way of life. Because we exist in a complex social world
these concepts and criteria that define our worth and
worthyness may become contested. To the extent that
evaluative concepts can be viewed as the "natural order,"
so long as we may understand such concepts as competency,
achievement, intelligence, womanhood, control, or indiv-
iduality as immutable, then the social world may remain
static. When victims of the prevailing moral concepts
can being alternative perspectives into the social arena
and present their contradictions, only then may the forces
of contest and change be engaged.
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The Problematics of a
Social Science
•nie empiricist tradition in social science has
failed to comprehend the relationship of our social
concepts and our social way of life. In light of the
preceding discussion, the idea of an empiricist social
science loses its sense. If we understand the essential
contestability of social concepts, then the scientific
belief in the possibility of "objective description,"
"general laws," "prediction," and "empirical tests of
theory" take on new meaning. They no longer represent
the canons of discovery. Rather, they become the rules
for conservative social action. Such a world view oper-
ates as a force to fix conceptual reality at the status
quo
.
The rules for the proper use of our moral
notions, however, are at the same time
rules for what those notions are about;
they are rules for our behavior. (Kovesi,
Moral Notions, p. 53)
.
. .
the objectivated world loses its
comprehensibility as a human enterprise
and becomes fixated as a non-human, non-
humanizable, inert facticity. Typically
the real relationship between man and his
world is reversed in consciousness. Man
the producer of a world, is apprehended
as its product, and the human activity
as an epiphenomenon of non-human processes.
Human meanings are no longer understood
as world producing but as being, in their
turn, products of the "nature of things."
It must be emphasized that reification is
a modality of consciousness, more precise-
ly, a modality of man's objectification
of the human world. Even while apprehending
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Varaio.i.ally o/llUZi:;i llalZflltdemes himself CBerpPT- ^^aL.^ty that
1966 n 8q^ TTT Luckmann,L^DD, p. «y) . [Emphasis added]
Empiricist aspirations are a hoax that have ob-
scured the essential embededness of the social scientist
within the phenomena of inquiry. And to understand
that we are necessarily both inquirers and participants
in social reality is to fundamentally change the problem-
atics of the social scientific enterprise. If we may
not take the "objective" point of view then from what
perspective are we viewing phenomena? If we do not pur-
sue "general laws" then what are our goals? What replaces
the "empirical test" and the criteria of "prediction"
as the arbitrer of competing concepts and theories?
Let us reconsider then some of the problematics
of a social science. While the discussion thus far
obviously precludes the possibility of an objective
and detached science, we may not simply endorse the
converse of objectivity. To say that the concepts we
use in describing social reality help constitute that
reality is not to claim that reality is no move than its
subjective or intersubjective representations. We may
not say that social reality is no more than the concepts
we use in describing it.
Human beings can only act toward the
world on the basis of some "understanding,"
but it does not follow from this that
their activity, or the world, possesses
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the character which they "understandIt to have. (Lichtman, 1970, p. 92)
Human activities have a relationship
to each other which is an objective con-stituent of the world. These relation-ships may come to be known, but thevare obviously not identical to anyknowing of them. (p. 77)
Some philosophers and social thinkers have come very
close to the completely volunteerist alternative to
empiricism (e.g.. Winch, 1958; Blumer, 1969; Berger
and Luckmann. 1966). But if empiricism alienates us
from our generative contributions to the social order,
then volunteerism underestimates significant elements
of the human condition that constrain social participa-
tion and self
-consciousness
.
The concepts of "self-deception,"
"false-conscious-
ness," "repression," and "unconscious" have persisted
in the lexicon for understanding human actions because
they continue to offer explanatory power generally and,
I believe, because almost all of us at one time or another
have identified these processes within our own biographies.
Moreover, if we accept the position that social existence
and subjective conceptions of it perfectly mirror each
other, then complete understanding of society should be
achievable through close study of its isolated individuals.
The impossibility if not absurdity of such a contention
is self-evident. Within the volunteerist position there
is no room for a distinction between "appearance" and
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"reality." There is no possibility for deception and
detection, or social illusion and social structure
(cf. Connolly, 1977). If such distinctions were not
central to our social existence one might wonder at the
persistence of our "queries."
"discoveries,"
"reforms."
and "mistakes" about social life. As I have argued
previously, supporting claims to the "correct" or "valid-
characterization of reality is problematic, but at the
same time we may not abandon this concept completely
without leaping into an abyss of solypsism or radical
relativism (Lichtman. 1970; Connolly, 1977).
The new problematic for social science then lies
in our participation in constituting a social reality
that has real consequences which themselves are, in
their turn, conceived within our commitments to a way
of life. VJe may not objectify social reality; neither
may we deny that, in part, it stands outside our subjec-
tive understandings of it. If this understanding of
the problematic is accepted then it is clear that social
science must establish new aspirations that accept the
impossibility of accruing "facts" through detached ob-
servation.
Good Faith Social Science
I am proposing that the idea of an "objective
and valid" social science be expanded by the broader
imperative of a science in good faith. The aspiration
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of objectivity through valid methods would be replaced
by the pursuit of disciplined self
-consciousness
. I am
using the term "good faith" not in the Sartrian sense
of exorcising all self-deception ("mauvaise foi," Being
and Nothingness). Rather, by good faith I mean to focus
on the problematics of placing self-consciousness at the
center of the participant-inquirer dilemma. Good faith
social science then describes a form of relationship with-
in a society and a way of life. It is the pursuit of self-
consciousness concerning the perspectives of our concepts,
theories and empirical activities. But self
-consciousness
is not something to be achieved and reported by individuals
It involves a dialectical relationship that may be estab-
lished among good faith participants attempting to illum-
inate perspectives and their consequences, and from this
form and re-form their way of life.
The central issues for a good faith social science
will reside in our relationships with those we are studying
and the society of which we are members. If the reader
has followed the discussion this far, it should be clear
that I am arguing that within the theoretical-empirical
enterprise is the negotiation of reality. And as in any
negotiation the central themes are not only truth and
falsehood but fairness and deception. I^^:lile there are
technical and procedural issues involved, at the heart
of the relationship are the human concerns with morality
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and social responsibility. And the challenge for the
social sciences is to reconsider the activities and
practices of our discipline within this imperative. We
are faced with very basic questions and dilemmas regard-
ing the social scientific way of life. The contours
of conceptual meaning and behavior that help constitute
our relationships constrain and form the interpretations
of disciplined inquiry. And the worthiness or validity
of any conceptual point of view cannot be established or
refuted through simple empirical tests. The issues are
moral and normative; they reflect commitments to a way
of life and a position in the social order. And because
our concepts are also commitments they elude simple indivi-
dual self-reflection and introspection.
The legitimate aspirations for a good faith social
science must include the elucidation of socially and
historically generated conceptions and the disciplined
investigation of their constitutive human actions. Con-
ceptual realities, social actions and scientific inquiry
are all internally related. Nonetheless, I believe that
the development of a self
-reflective and critical con-
sciousness within our discipline can begin to establish
a reasoned dynamic to these relations. Our specific
tasks in this regard may not be defined and set into
mechanical motion. Rather, the critical question may be,
where do we begin? I believe that within the social
sciences we can effectively begin this process by
a reconsideration of our most cherished rituals of
empiricism. The method and mechanics of inquiry have
represented a sort of sacrosanct and holy cookbook
.
results guaranteed. In succeeding chapters I will
suggest that our methods may be re-viewed. Methods
are not only directions for disciplined inquiry; they
are also the vehicles of our social perspectives and
commitments. They may therefore be the most useful
vehicles for self
-reflection. And if we replace the
dimensions of method within this dialectical perspective,
perhaps the dynamics of a critically self-conscious
dialogue may be initiated.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL RESEARCH:
METHODS AS ACTIONS
Research methods and the "rules of competent
inquiry" help constitute the heart of the empiricist
enterprise. Research methods are, of course, the actions
and decisions of investigators, designed to allow more
systematic consideration of social phenomena. However,
these canons of scientific investigation, "reconstructed
logic" in the words of Abraham Kaplan (1964), are often
understood in formal/ structural terms that tend to obscure
the role of the researcher as actor and decision maker.
It is my contention that a simple refocusing, highlighting
and explicating these dimensions of human action will allow
important insights into the nature of social scientific
enterprises and the social commitments within which they
operate.
"Statistics," "research methods," and "experimental
design" have been viewed as the first and initiating courses
for any serious student of the social sciences. Methodo-
logical concerns are, in the empiricist view, the procedures
for valid discovery, hence their central role in science.
As has been aptly pointed out by others, our methods have
preceded our substance (Koch, 1959). Research methods
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have been seen as "tools- for discovery and these
tools have become prior to and detached from the tool
users. Research methods and designs are applied to
"a phenomenon" and a "subject population." The correct
application of method is thought to insure the discovery
or demonstration of scientifically valid laws.
This conception of research methods as tools that
exist detached from the researcher or the researched is
reflected in the language with which methods are described
It seems that research design and techniques are seen as
independent entities.
Designs are carefully worked out to
y-Leld dependable and valid answers to
the research questions epitomized bythe hypothesis.
How does design acaomplish this? Re-
search design sets up the framework
for adequate tests of the relations
among variables. Design tells us, in
a sense, what observations to make,
how to make them, and how to analyze
the quantitative representations of the
observations
.
Finally, an adequate design outlines
possible conclusions to be drawn from
statistical analysis.
(Kerlinger, 1966, p. 276)
[Emphasis added]
This general discussion above is followed by
the description of "poor" and "good" research designs.
Moreover, this abstracted conception of research design
is not unique to Kerlinger but is echoed in most major
research methods texts (e.g., Festinger and Katz, 1953;
55
Selltiz et al., 1951; Crano and Brewer, 1973; Runkel
and McGrath, 1972; and others).
To say that research methods are detached from
their human users and contexts is not to deny that there
are a great many controversies about proper methods of
inquiry. But of course, these controversies are them-
selves understood as disputes over the rules for scienti-
fic discovery. Debates revolve around abstract and
utilitarian characterizations of the research enterprise:
where should research be conducted (laboratory vs field
and naturalistic observation)?, what is the best form of
resultant data (quantitative vs qualitative designs,
multivariate vs univariate designs, orthogonal and non-
orthogonal relationships)?, what are the most powerful
mechanics of research analysis (experimental, correla-
tional, time series analysis)? The discourse has remained
technical and object oriented. We've got a hammer, where
do we pound?; we've got a hammer how can we make it a
better pounding tool?
The current conceptions of social scientific methods
tend to obscure the fact that research strategies are
constituted by researcher decisions and actions within
a social context. A social research project is not an
abstract exercise in scientific investigaton ; it is a
substantive and meaningful relationship between an inves-
tigator and the participants in the study. The obscuring
I
or
of this social relationship between the researcher,
the participants, and the activities of inquiry stands
as both a fundamental element of empiricism and a maj,
impediment to self
-consciousness about our roles in the
negotiation of social reality. If social scientists
are to pursue a self-consciousness about the scientific
enterprise, the methods of inquiry must be reconsidered
as researcher actions on and with particular phenomena
and particular people.
In this chapter, I will re-characterize research
methods as the decisions and actions of researchers. I
will focus attention on what social scientists do to
and with those being studied. My intention is not to
dazzle the reader with startling insight so much as to
review familiar concepts from a slightly different point
of view. Many of the characterizations that follow will
appear obvious upon the naming. Nonetheless, this analy-
sis will support further consideration of the scientist's
role in empirical inquiry. In subsequent chapters re-
searcher actions and decisions will be reconsidered as
the elements from which researcher-participant relation-
ships are built. This perspective will later provide
a viewpoint from which to address issues that are largely
ignored by empiricism. Within the social scientific
way of life, how do our social relations help form and
constrain scientific conclusions?; how do our scientific
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conclusions participate in shaping the constitution
of social reality. But first it will be useful to
focus closer attention on some dimensions of researcher
action with the subjects of social inquiry.
Controll ing Antecedent Conditions
The term "antecedent condition" refers to researcher
defined social or physical conditions that are thought
to affect human behavior in some way. Together, "antecedent"
and "consequent" conditions represent the key concepts of
theoretical models; the hypothesized relationship between
these two elements is the subject of empirical study. The
researcher may ask, for example, does "frustration" (ante-
cedent condition) lead to increased "aggression" (consequent)
E.P. Willems (1969, p. 46) has defined the dimension of
controlling antecedent conditions as "the degree of the
investigator's influence upon, or manipulation of antecedent
conditions of behavior." The act of controlling antecedent
conditions is of course the hallmark of what has come to
be called the experimental paradigm. Researchers communi-
cate persuasive messages, present carefully designed ex-
perimental tasks, and in general expose "subjects" to highly
controlled and systematically varied sets of "stimulus con-
ditions." Research strategies in which investigators may
not control antecedent conditions include a wide range of
survey research projects and observational studies. While
behaviors or verbal reports are carefully measured, the
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researcher has no control over preceding conditions.
Although these investigators may sample across system-
atically defined populations (socioeconomic levels, edu-
cation levels, etc.), they do not control the prior ex-
periences of those they are researching.
The use of systematic researcher control permeates
well beyond the confines of the laboratory experiment.
Similarly, exerting control over antecedent conditions
is not a necessary feature of experimentation. The focus
here remains, what the researcher does, not where research
occurs or what the activity is called. Participant ob-
servers, for example, often include elements of researcher
control as one tactic for generating information. Self-
conscious violation of social rules (Turner, 1974) or
judicious attempts at role consonant behavior are often
effective for creating or controlling a situation in the
interests of generating opportunities to observe the re-
sponse of others (McCall and Simmons, 1969; Wheeler, 1978).
Clinical and "depth" interviewers "probe," "assume roles
in the relationship," and utilize a variety of other tech-
niques of explicit interpersonal control in the interests
of eliciting interpretable responses. Moreover, it should
be recognized that serendipitous or naturalistic experi-
ments may sometimes be instances of true experiments in
the field, the conditions occurring outside of the re-
searcher's control. Social programs instituted by
governmental agencies n3^n•ra^ ^-.-^6cin_j.e , atu l disasters, or draft
lotteries may offer occasions of low researcher control
and random assignment of individuals to experimental
groups (Cook and Campbell, 1975, pp. 116-195).
Researcher control over research conditions is
an activity that serves the researchers' own scientific
purposes. This activity may be referred to as "experi-
mental control," "role participation," "role taking" or
any number of other designations. The controlling rela-
tionship is designed to create systematic variations in
social conditions for the purpose of researcher theory
testing, and/or to create surrogate events to stand-in
for difficult to study natural phenomena (e.g., highly
frustrating situations or infrequent and private social
role behaviors). Similarly, investigators may choose
to sample rather than control antecedent conditions when
this strategy better serves their theoretical needs.
Of course, describing and sampling is no less an action
than directly controlling; it is simply a different
kind of action. The investigator characterizes popula-
tions or situations (e.g., ghetto dwellers, high density
rooms, successful women, etc.) and then observes some
theoretically relevant behavior of his/her choosing.
Controlling or sampling, researchers must act to define,
manipulate, and/or measure any antecedent conditions rel-
evant to their purposes.
Imposing Units of Measurement
A second dimension of the researcher's action
and decision concerns the extent to which s/he imposes
restrictions on the range or spectrum of behavioral
responses that will be considered data. To what extent
does the investigator determine or limit the form of
measured and recorded responses. At the extremes, social
scientists may limit measured responses to the check
marks on a preformed scale. On the other hand, the re-
searcher's use of open and unstructured interviews may
allow respondents to relate a wide variety of verbal and
nonverbal information that may later become part of the
analyzable data.
VJhen investigators structure units of measurement
they are assured of detecting predetermined relevant
information and they are assured of having that infor-
mation in the form most useful to them (i.e., observa-
tions pick-up all relevant dimensions of predefined be-
havior, measurements are scaled as the researcher desires)
When investigators avoid imposing units of measurement,
observational information may not occur in expected forms.
Participants may utilize unexpected behavioral and verbal
responses styles. This may be viewed as relevant and
informative in and of itself. The point is, both inves-
tigative actions serve to shape the relationship between
researcher and participant and the form of subsequent
data.
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Roger Barker (1969) has described two types of
relationship between the investigator and those being
studied. The psychologist as "operator" (0 Type Data)
and the psychologist as "transducer" (T Type Data)
. 0
Data involves the active participation of the investiga-
tor in regulating input or affecting the phenomena (con-
trolling antecedent conditions), followed by the psycho-
logist's "translating" the observed outcome (imposing
units of measure). Researchers collecting T Data, on the
other hand, attempt to avoid operations on the phenomena
and instead concentrate on the translation, or coding, of
observed responses. In both cases, however. Barker describes
the psychologist as highly involved in translating, coding,
or imposing units of measurement. The ethological tradition
has concentrated more attention on this issue of translating
observed phenomena. Traditionally, the ethological orien-
tation has stressed the importance of detailed description
avoiding researcher imposed units of measure in order to
facilitate the accurate representation of the behavior
observed (Marler and Hamilton, 1966; Schneirla, 1951).
Hutt and Hutt (1970) drew a clear distinction between
"ethological" and "ecological" (Barker, 1965; Wright, 1967)
approaches around this very issue. Their distinction
clearly highlights the fact that researchers within the
two orientations, who are in agreement about eschewing
control of antecedent conditions, vary in the degree to
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which they see themselves as imposing observational
units of measurement. From Hutt and Hutt's point of
view, investigators using ethological approaches adhere
more strictly to behavioral description, at least ini-
tially disallowing imposed categorizations or organi-
zation of behaviors (p. 22-25)
Other research traditions have also emphasized
the implications of using methods of measurement which
impose a priori restrictions on the recording of pheno-
mena into data. Interviewers as well as participant
observers may vary in the degree to which they impose
units of measure. The same issue has been considered
by those concerned with the relative advantages and
limitations of unstructured procedures and participant
observation (Dean et al., 1969; Vidich and Shapiro. 1955).
Several authors have pointed out that within almost any
research project the observer may fluctuate from less
structured approaches to frequency counts of operation-
ally defined behaviors, in the latter case imposing cat-
egories or units on the stream of behavior (Lofland, 1971;
Becker, 1958).
The methods of Kendon and Ferber (1973) in observing
human greetings may be used as a clear example of decisions
to avoid constraining measurement units with a priori
impositions. After thoroughly documenting the physical
environment, context, and nature of the population under
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study, these investigators used film and video-tape
recording to observe the greeting behavior of some
middle-class adults at a private outdoor party. Cameras
were kept at the edges of the party site. Guests were
filmed from the time they approached on the walkway until
they parted from the host or hostess. Initially, the
only restrictions on filmed observations were the defin-
ition of the phenomenon of interest. Cameras focused on
greetings from the time the guests first came within
sight of the host-hostess and earlier arrivals. It may
also be noted here that this research strategy may be
seen as exerting very little control over antecedent
conditions. n.e party was a real event. The investiga-
tors had no control over the existing relationship of
guests to each other, time of arrival, order of persons
in meeting each other, etc.
Kendon and Ferber's investigative strategy of
avoiding imposed response categories and controlled
situations resulted in both gains and losses of pertinent
information. Any questions or verbal probes would have
elicited responses partly shaped by the structure of
their questions. On the other hand, avoiding such im-
positions resulted in the loss of any access to internal
experiences associated with the greeting behaviors that
were the subject of inquiry.
The research paradigm used by Byrn (1969)
to investigate the relationship of similarity and
attraction between persons may be used to illustrate
researcher actions designed to highly control behav-
ioral antecedents and impose rigid units of measure-
ment. Each respondent is given a short attitude ques-
tionnaire on some topic. He/She is then shown another
copy of this questionnaire, supposedly completed by
a second individual. The responses on this second ques-
tionnaire vary in the degree to which they are "similar"
to the responses of the respondent (independent variable)
Finally, liking or attraction of the respondent toward
this hypothetical stranger is measured by two questions
(How much do you think you would like/dislike this per-
son? and Would you enjoy/dislike working with this per-
son?)
.
The respondent places an "X" on a seven point
scale, indicating the degree of "attraction" (dependent
variable). The antecedent condition (similarity of re-
spondent and hypothetical stranger) is under the total
control of the investigator as communicated through the
presented questionnaire responses. Likewise, the inves-
tigator imposes rigid units of measurement, allowing
participants to express "attraction," but only within
the structure of their answers to two scaled question-
naire items.
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Of course, researrhp-rc i-u^-t- •
,
j-ej>earcne s that impose units of
measurement may utilize sampling rather than control
of antecedent conditions in forming their investiga-
tive strategies. For example, Byrn's procedures may
be contrasted with other research cited by him con-
cerning the same theoretical issues. Several researchers
measured the attitudes and personality traits of married
couples and friends in an attempt to assess the degree
to which these persons (presumably attracted to each
other) were similar on these dimensions (Schiller, 1932;
Kirkpatrick and Stone, 1935; Schooley, 1951; Richardson,
1940). The measured variable, similarity, was once again
obtained by imposing limitations on the participants'
response style. Each completed a set of scaled question-
naires (high imposition of units). On the other hand,
the investigators had no control over the antecedent
conditions of attraction in the relationships.
Controlling antecedent conditions and imposing
units of measurement are two independent dimensions
of researcher action in relationship with participants.
Moreover, decisions and choices along these dimensions
of control and measurement shape the information avail-
able for subsequent analysis. One way or the other
the investigator must act, and the consequences of his/
her actions will help define the relationship with par-
ticipants, the shape of resultant data, and therefore
the range of rational interpretations available.
Concealing the Invps^-i p.^.-..^
intentions ~
There is by this time a rather extensive liter-
ature concerning the reactivity of persons to being
observed, measurement as a change agent, evaluation
apprehension and related topics (Orne, 1962; Rosenberg,
1969; Rosenzweig, 1933; Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook
and Campbell, 1975; Argyris, 1968; and others). Scien-
tists have concentrated much attention on "subject re-
activity" as a threat to "veridical scientific investi-
gation." Their approaches have varied depending on orien-
tation, beliefs, assumptions, judgments and the particular
objectives of the researchers carrying out the project.
It is important to note however that their concerns have
focused on creating the "correct" and "effective" methods
of empirical investigation. Without referring to "validity
issues" or "subject reactivity" it is still possible to
characterize researcher relationships with respondents
by the extent to which the research enterprise is made
explicit and salient to those participating. To what
extent does the investigator disguise, hide, or submerge
the agendas, intentions and objectives of his/her relation-
ship with respondents.
Discussions of "unobtrusiveness" in research have
been concerned, in general, with strategies for lowering
the saliency of "observation," "investigation," and
"theoretical hypotheses" within the researcher-partici-
pant relationship. Webb et al. (1966) discussed this
in terms of removing the instruments of observation from
the participants' view. The hidden camera, hidden counter
or natural archival study would be examples of such a
tactical approach. This orientation represents the most
common understanding of unobtrusiveness
. These same
concerns have been reflected in the common researcher
strategy of "deception" and concealment of hypotheses
in social psychological experimentation (Foreward, et al.,
1976)
.
While the participants often know they are in
a psychological experiment, complex procedures and "cover
stories" are used to obscure the purposes and hypotheses
of the sttidy. It is, of course, equally true of many
participant observers that they do not disclose all their
intentions or preliminary hypotheses to those being studied.
Similarly, survey researchers and interviewers will main-
tain an openness about individual questions while concealing
broader research intentions, theoretical perspectives and
hypotheses
.
Of course, concealing research goals and intentions
from participants is a two-edged sword. VThile researchers
may gain some assurance of "noncontamination" (e.g., ignor-
ance of researchers' hypotheses and expected results),
concealment is also recognized as alienating the researcher
from the perceptions, beliefs and intentions of those
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being studied. Participant observers will often reveal
the full nature of their research enterprise to selected
informants in the interests of eliciting useful and
unexpectedly pertinent information. Recently, social
psychologists have shown renewed interest in role-playing
techniques as a means of gaining more insight into social
phenomena. These techniques often include relatively
full explicitness about research interests and agendas
(e.g., Mixon, 1971; Baron, 1976). Mixon, for example,
asked participants to engage with him in a role playing
replication of the classic Milgram (1963) obedience study.
Each person played all roles (subject, learner, experi-
menter, and bystander). Through eliciting self-reflections
on personal experience and systematically varying elements
of each role, he was able to shed new light on the inter-
pretation and human meaning of the "obedience" phenomenon
as it was originally reported by Milgram.
Both concealing and nonconcealing researcher strat-
egies constitute decision/actions that shape relationships
and constrain subsequent conclusions. Concealment tends
to alienate the researcher from participants' phenomenal
experiences and interpretations of the situations observed
or constructed by the investigator. Revealing intention
and theoretical objectives raises questions about parti-
cipants' motives of self-presentation , and their compliance/
resistance vis a vis the researchers' favored hypotheses.
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Once again, it is clear that researchers must act. and
at the same time any actions on their part serve to
shape and constrain conclusions and interpretations.
Control ling Research Contexts
Researchers may not only act to control the forms
of observation/measurement and the introduction of ante-
cedent events, but also some elements of the context or
milieu within which these research relationships are
pursued. To what extent does the researcher control or
on the other hand describe the physical and social back-
drop for the investigation of the focal theoretical issues
Who creates the circumstances within which data are col-
lected? ^Who controls the dimensions of legitimate activi-
ty, the researcher or the participants? The classic lab-
oratory study represents an attempt by the investigator
to manipulate theoretical variables, measurement pro-
cedures and the surrounding context of the research re-
lationship. The subject engages in the researcher's tasks,
responds to the researcher's questions within the re-
searcher's controlled domain, designed to serve only the
purposes of the researcher. Field experimenters may
control research variables of interest and the form of
observations while allowing the surrounding context to
continue unperturbed. Sherif and his colleagues (1961)
for example, took advantage of the routines at a boys'
summer camp to systematically intervene in games and
camp tasks and observe the consequent patterns of
cooperation and competition among the campers. However
they did not control the surrounding context of the
summer camp experience. The researchers' enterprise
was embedded within a context defined by others and
serving to achieve other purposes.
Popular mythology within the social scientific
community has muddled the discussion of context. Field
research (a category typically used for discussions of
contextual issues in research) has been discussed and/or
endorsed by numerous authors making a variety of points:
Brunswik (1955) representative design; Barker (1965)
and Wright (1967) ecological psychology; Weick (1968)
systematic observational methods; Sanford (1970) action
research; McGuire (1967, 1973) changing orientations in
social psychology, just to mention a few. Such a state
of affairs could easily confuse the concept as it is
defined here. Contextual control refers to the activitie
and choices of a researcher which are designed to control
the milieu within which he/she focuses on behavioral
variables of theoretical interest. As I have implied
above, the decision to control the research context is
independent of decisions about controlling theoretically
defined antecedent variables or the extent to which
measurement units are imposed by the investigator. The
laboratory investigator creates a controlled context in
order to establish
"uncontaminated" and "simplified-
surroundings within which to manipulate and measure be-
haviors of interest. Other researchers (such as Sherlf
et al., in the Robbers Cave Experiment, or social pro-
gram evaluators, Campbell, 1969) may control chosen con-
ditions but measure "effects"
.ithU uncontrolled con-
texts that serve purposes other than those of the re-
searcher (boys camps are for fun, and participants in
social programs are pursuing their own lives not the
interests of science)
.
The distinction between "theoretical variables"
and "context" in social research is determined by the
researcher's perceptions of "figure and ground." And
in the same way that the well-known visual illusion may
shift from "vase" to "human profiles" depending on how
you look at it, "theoretical variables" and "context"
may reverse themselves depending on the researcher's
point of view. This is of course true whether the re-
searcher chooses to control or describe the context
which surrounds the theoretical phenomenon. For many
years the "experimenter" was simply part of the context
("Procedures were carried out" as the studies often
read) of social psychological experiments. By focusing
on the experimenter and "experimenter effects," Rosenthal
(1966) and others reversed the perceptual field such
that the experimenter was considered a "critical variable."
This figure-ground reversal created reverberating
effects within the field permanently altering the way
researchers discuss, conduct and report experimental
studies. In a similar fashion, the current rhetorical
vogue advocating emphasis on social psychological re-
search with more representative populations was at
least partially a result of increasing concerns that
the use of college sophomores in research was not simply
contextual background but perhaps a critical determinant
of research results. All social researchers act to
define focal phenomena and explanatory concepts as dis-
tinct from surrounding contexts. Empirical researchers,
with Hhese perceptual frames in mind, conduct their re-
search relationships through controlling and/or describing
their conceptions of the contextual surrounding vis a vis
their chosen theoretical phenomena.
Defining the Rules by Which
Phenomena Are Translated
Into Data ~"
From the researcher's perspective the empirical
investigation is an exercise in structured observation
for the purpose of generating information. Verbal
description and physical procedures that clearly define
concepts and actions allow the researcher's experiences
to become publicly accessible and interpretable
. Like
anyone else, scientists are most clearly understood when
they can communicate the meaning of their concepts,
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definitions and perceptions with as little ambiguity
as possible. There are a variety of researcher strate-
gies for establishing clear definitions in empirical
research. All of these may be understood as various
ways of defining the rules and procedures by which
phenomena are conceptualized and translated into data.
Operational description, as a strategy for empiri-
cal definition, while rarely used in its pure form, still
enjoys wide acceptance among social scientists as a
standard of aspiration. Concepts must be defined utiliz-
ing discretely observable behaviors and explicit rules
of combination (e.g., certain behaviors are defined as
"aggressive," the more of these behaviors that occur
[summative combinatorial rule] the higher the person is
in "aggressiveness")
.
High amounts of palmer sweating
and skin conductivity (GSR), for example, may be defined
as data indicating that a person is physiologically
"aroused." However, behind this definition are the rules
for translating the phenomena (palmer sweating) into data
(GSR measures)
.
The rules in this case are constituted
by the description of the electronic measuring instru-
ment and the procedures for its proper use. Knowing the
rules (the equipment specifications and procedures) any
investigator wishing to use the same operational defini-
tion of "arousal" (palmer sweating and GSR) could be
assured that s/he is considering the same empirical
concept and phenomenon as the first researcher. A
concept is empirically defined solely through the
operational rules for translating the phenomenon into
data. Other examples of the operationalis t approach
may clarify this point: attitudes are defined as in-
dividuals' scores on properly constructed attitude
scales; intelligence is an individual's score on a
properly constructed ("reliable" and "valid") intelli-
gence test. And the rules of "proper construction" are
defined in terms of standard attitude scaling and psy-
chometric procedures. As an ideal there are clearly
prescribed procedures and actions (reliability tests,
item stability checks, predictive validity tests, con-
vergent validity tests, and so on) that constitute the
rules for translating (scale construction) these phen-
omena into "data."
While operational description is still a common
aspiration, in practice many social scientists use
definitional strategies that are a good deal less
explicit and rigidly constructed. The two major cate-
gories may be characterized as intuitive and intro-
spective descriptions.
Kaplan (1964) defines intuition as "(1) precon-
scious, and (2) outside the inference schema for which
we have readily available reconstructions" (p. 14)
While intuitive description is based on observables,
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although perhaps less well explicated than in the
operationalist strategy, the rules for combining obser-
vables to define a construct are left undescribed or
loosely described. Wright (1967) emphasizes that de-
finitions and descriptions in this model rely on "every-
day knowledge and perception" (pp. 24-25), common sense.
He cites an example which may clarify the distinction
between operationalism and what I am calling intuition.
From Wright's point of view this record is incomplete:
i^^^ ^"""8 "P"^''<^ through an
chin
'^^Srees and landed on Henry's
He suggests this as a better record:
John hit Henry with apparent intent
to hurt him.
The basis of intuitive description is clearly within
publicly observable behaviors. But the observer might
be hard pressed to describe the rules by which the
construct "intent to hurt" was intuited. This represents
a non-public, unexplicated process of translation.
Winch (1958) offers a similar example in describing
a cat which is seriously hurt.
We say the cat "writhes" about. Suppose
I describe his very complex movements
in purely mechanical terms, using a set
of space-time coordinates. This is, in
a sense, a description of what is going
on as much as is the statement that the
cat is writhing in pain. But one state-
ment could not be substituted for the
other. The statement which includes the
concept of writhing says something which
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no statement of the other sort hr.r.ever detailed, could ap;rox?Lte ?r
rau??^.?^/^ writhing belongs to
"
of^^hl ^^"^^^^t framework from that
of ZlclTlT' t in teSsr spa e-time coordinates, (p. 73-74)
"Writhing., is an intuitive statement, based on observ-
able events but going beyond these events through in-
ference rules that are difficult if not impossible
to explicate.
Introspective description refers to use of the
observer's subjective experiences as sources of data.
These experiences are. of course, not publicly observ-
able and the rules for their construction relatively
unaccessible. Perhaps the clearest example of the use
of .private experience is the clinician's attention to
his/her feelings toward a client at a particular time
as information about what the client is expressing. Such
references are common in case study reports. Introspection
also appears as one of the strongest arguments for part-
icipant observation as a rich data collection strategy.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of this method for
social science is its emphasis on the significant data
obtainable by observers attending to their own responses
in the participant role (McCall and Simmons, 1969; Lofland,
1971). For example, Howard Becker (1963), in his study
of jazz musicians, had inside information, special knowledge
unattainable except for his experience as a participant
in that group. This information was not publicly available
and the rules by which ^y W he constructed perceptions were
inexplicit
.
social scientists
.ay choose to use operationalist
intuitive and/or introspective strategies for defining
'
concepts, Behaviors and activities within the empirical
investigation. Donald Campbell (1974) has argued that
even highly structured laboratory research, ostensibly
"lying only on operational rules for definition con-
tains significant elements of the intuitive process. And
Ukewise, participant observation reasearch ™ay so^eti.es
rely heavily on operational definitions
.ore suitable
for quantifiable analysis (Becker. 1969). But one way
_
or the other,
"description"
„ust involve both a pheno-
menal event and some action by the investigator. The
investigator must set the rules by which these phenomena
Will be translated into data.
The empiricist perspective constructs an understanding
of the research enterprise and the dimensions of social
scientific activity within its own framework of aspira-
tions: "accurate description," "valid conclusions" and
"universal laws." These aspirations and the consequent
construal of research activity as "the logic of discovery-
have tended to deemphasize the human decisions and actions
that constitute the investigative endeavor. The purposes
of this chapter have been to reorient attention to de-
cision making and actions that occur when researchers inter-
^hese actions the in.esUg.tor shapes
.he structure
and form of his/her re]p^-^^« u-lationship with the subjects of
empirical inquiry.
.
'
^'^^"^'^ P"^--^^ <Chapter II) that social
sc^ence is necessariX, the stud, of hoth social concepts
and social behavior. Moreover, social concepts arise
out of relationships a.ong people. Social inquir, is
relationships. This definition of social science and
social reality is of course circular; and that is pre-
cisely the dilen»,a of the hu^an condition. Our under-
standing of ourselves is largely constituted by who we
'are and the for. of our hu^an relationships. If social
scientists wish to pursue inquiry into the forms of
social phenomena then they must come to grips with the
implications of their own active participation.
I would like to argue that as social scientists
we constrain our perceptions through our social per-
spectives and that these constraints are manifest in
the way we Interact with those we study. Researcher
actions and decisions within empirical investigations
shape research relationships and therefore the scienti-
fic conclusions that emerge from them. Through the
institutions of social science, research reports, pop-
ular science, applied research and consultation, social
scientists particiDfl^^= i-n t-u^ tP m pate m the larger social drama. That
is, our social perspectivpq i-nfr^^rr,y c es inform our participation in
the constitution of the same <?oo-?oiLn social reality that is the
object of our inquiry.
\
CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIPS, COMON SENSE. AND USEFULNESS
When researchers
.ake scientific decisions and en-
gage in investigative actions they necessarily shape a
particular relationship with those who are the subjects
of their inquiry. And because this „ust be true the
empirical enterprise cannot be fully understood without
considering the implications of these researcher actions
and relationships. Research methods are indeed more than
mere "tools" for discovery. They are researcher actions
within a relationship with those being researched. And
a refocusing on these relationships and their implica-
tions for social science begins to clarify new aspirations
for an empirical enterprise without empiricism.
To say that social scientific research is consti-
tuted by researcher actions in relationship with those
researched is not in itself a criticism of the endeavor.
Rather, by highlighting scientist participation in the
empirical enterprise I am simply proposing that social
scientific methods cannot separate the social scientist
from human relationships and human responsibility. Like
all other human activities empirical research and social
theory are participatory, collective and social under-
takings. By drawing out the dimensions and implications
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of our research relationships, it „ay be possible
to engage in them
.ore self-consciously, and more
reflectively. m so doing, social science will have
to relinquish its position as the priesthood of facts
As an alternative, however, social scientists may begin
to form another relationship of social responsibility
and social participation in good faith.
The following discussion will consider the actions
which Shape empirical relationships as forms of constraint
on the social reality that may be understood within them.
It will be argued that these relat.ionships necessarily
manifest fundamental social perspectives, and often these
perspectives are implicated in a social and normative
way of life. The ways in which empirical research rela-
tionships are constrained will be viewed as a manifesta-
tion of the way the researcher implicitly construes
social reality. The way in which social existence is
understood helps define the boundaries of social living,
the alternatives within conflicts, the shape of options
and opportunities, and the rules for success and failure,
normality and deviance. The social perspectives and the
social reality that constrains the research relationships
also constrains the potential uses of subsequent researcher
conclusions, theories, and "facts." It is then pertinent
to ask, what kind of relationship is occurring in the
research activity? What is the role of control and com-
?e
Pliance. selection and acceptance? what is the role
of concealed intentions in social scientific inquiry
And finally, when researchers
"make sense." "name th_
reality." of empirical relationships, who's "sense" is
this, who's "reality." and within which way of life?
Researcher Actions and
Relationships: Control ^iSd^iTg^^,-
A reconsideration of the dimensions of researcher
action casts new light on some old and rather tired
dichotomies. Characterizations such as behavioral vs
phenomenal, experimental vs qualitative, laboratory vs
naturalistic and others have been batted about as alter-
native strategies for competent investigation of social
phenomena. They have been debated for their utility in
gleaning the "facts" from a complex stream of social
behavior. While it is clear that the presumptions of
such controversies are misguided, there are important
distinctions within these debates and the distinctions
roughly correspond to two modes of action used by re-
searchers as they shape their relationships within the
empirical inquiry: control and selection.
Elements of researaher control are easily enough
recognized. For the purest cases, the laboratory ex-
periment is brought to mind. Highly controlled stimuli
are presented to participants (controlling antecedent
conditions) and the responses are measured by structured
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task perfonn^nces or rating scales (imposing units
Of measurement). The experiment takes place within
a researcher controlled setting (controlling contexts)
and responses are operationally defined, precisely and
mathematically constructed, according to rules chosen
by the researcher (operational definitions)
. There are
of course, elements of selection involved as well. The"
researcher chooses to selpo^ i ^ect randomly from a population
of college students, married couples, local gay co™,uni-
t-s, U.S. citizens, and so on depending on the researchers'
theoretical interests.
A somewhat different approach corresponds to re-
search strategies often described as ethnographic, parti-
cipant-observation or qualitative techniques. The re-
searcher will join with those being observed in an on-
going setting, controlling neither antecedents nor contexts.
The investigation may describe "causes" and contexts as
they are described by participants, using their units of
measurement and utilizing their explicit and/or inexplicit
intuitive and subjective styles of combining information
about experiences. But here too the researcher
.elects
and samples a population of his or her own definition
(e.g., neurotic clients, young medical interns, jazz musi-
cians, aggressive individuals, etc.) according to parti-
cular chosen theoretical interests.
One way or another, of course, the researcher
acts, decides and participates in the research rela-
tionship. Ml empirical inquiries contain elements of
researcher control and/or selection m varying degress
The debates over which strategies are ^ost effective
tend to „elt into irrelevance, however, as one considers
the character of the r&l ai-i r^r^c^wme relationships that follow from
these scientific actions and decisions.
I^iements of Control and .Sp I .
55EIrIIissioHaO^
Research relationships in which the researcher
exerts control can only proceed smoothly to the extent
that the participants are willing to cooperate. Highly
controlled relationships are relationships of asymetric
power and compliance. Subjects must be willing to attend
to the researcher's stimuli, accept the researcher's
tasks, and express themselves through the categories
and units presented by the researcher. When researchers
enter into relationships in which they hold the power of
control, and when participants cooperate and comply, then
we may say that they are engaged in a legitimate pro-
fessional relationship.
Elements of professionalism have been recognized
by others as inherent forms of relationship in experi-
mental research. Ingle (1977) offered a persuasive
review pulling- together the dimensions of "professionalism"
and
"legitimate power." interviews with prospective
experimental subjects have indicated that they expect
experimenters to display competence, efficiency and
concern for the subjects- physical and psychological
well-being, making sure not to embarrass, harm, or
disrespect them (Epstein et al 197,. c u ,iJ.., LS/j; Schulman and
Berman, 1975).
p:?en^^ro?e^li-a^•^'-| ^-''^
"^"-^
- pSuns,
of"?hese T^T,llisToT,re%tlt,, ll^''be competent in his field, to respect
n% fff;Jnc-mp-^e1c- vfo^L^-
cates t'hat'^h
°" respect, he ?ndi-
(Ep'sL^:;%'t^l^/[;75^1^^2iir^'^°p'^^"^ •
Epstein et al.'s understanding of the experimental rela-
tionship as a "professional" relationship is based on
well-known concepts of "legitimate power." Professionals
and researchers as a case in point, derive their legiti-
mate power from broad cultural value which give "experts"
and "specialists" the right to influence others within
prescribed contexts (Collins and Raven, 1969; French and
Raven, 1959; Ingle, 1977).
In order for the researcher to establish a legiti-
mate professional relationship s/he must be recognized
as a legitimate professional and an expert with certain
privileges. Moreover, the research relationship
tends to breakdo™ If, (i) subjects do not recognize
the legitimacy of the relan u-y n relationship at the outset or '
(2) the researcher is perceived as having violated
the bounds of professionalism through incompetence
or disrespect of the participant. That is to say in
order for the researcher to successfully establish a
relationship of control and professionalism, s/he must
eeleat participants from a population of indivduals who
will compl;, because they are willing to recognize the
legitimacy of the relationship and perceive the tasks
and forms of intera^•^^ /-.t^r eraction as competent, respectful, and
reasonable
.
It is instructive to consider the elements of re-
searcher control and professionalism, and participants'
compliance as relationships of tacit agreement. When
highly controlled research goes well, all parties agree
to interact within a particular relationship and set
of constructs. They have agreed that the relationships
and constructs do not seriously violate propriety or the
mutual sense of reasonableness and common sense. This
agreement and shared point of view constitutes the basis
of their professional relationship and the shape of re-
sultant empirical results. The necessary correspondence
between researcher and participant points of view in
controlled research is easily illustrated through con-
sideration of tacit agreements and "error variance"
m some typical experimental work.
Consider a typical experiment, concerned with
human responses to noxious experiences under varying
conditions of avoidability and information about its
onset. More generally, it was an experiment addressing
.ssues of behavioral response under varying conditions
of respondent control.
Briefly, as subjects awaited an electricshock, not knowing when it would occurthey were free to switch back and forthbetween two channels of a tape recorderOne channel provided a warning signal
thl n'if"
before the shock wal to^ccur-e other channel provided only back-
feHo/l^^'"- subjects chose to lis-t n tor the warning signal they couldpress a button upon hearing it, and per-haps avoid the electric shock The ef-fectiveness of the avoidance response
trifls, being either 100%,
al
:
1977,°p^°^°96^'^''^^•
The researcher instructed each subject that they
might control the shocks by attending to the tone and
pressing an avoidance response button. The research
questions concerned the amount of time that subjects
would listen to the tone (rather than irrelevant music)
thereby increasing their chances of controlling shocks
through their vigilance to the warning signal.
The researchers, in controlling and shaping the
experimental tasks, created a situation in which sub-
jects' potential control over shocks varied from 0% to
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100% if they pushed the avoidance button. That is
the researchers in.Uea tHe su.Je.u to so oonstrue
tHeir oontrol over shocks. But this is not the only
way to understand the situation. This perspective
directs attention to the probability of shocU^^ as the
focus of defined control. if fe„er shocks occur sub-
sequent to avoidance responses then that constitutes
potential control. However, this situation could
be considered to be one in which the relevant referent
was not only the probability of shock but also the re-
search relationship in a larger context. That is, the
experimenter allowed the subjects certain probabilities
of shock if the avoidance button were pushed, and the
experimenter could change or withdraw that condition.
The experimenter, rather than the established shock
probabilities, could quite reasonably be considered
the focus of any definition of control in this situa-
tion. It is clear that anyone so construing the exper-
imental situation would, having already agreed to parti-
cipate, perceive little meaningful variability in his/her
potential for control. The experimenter maintained con-
trol and the designated probability of shocks would be
considered relatively trivial in comparison to this
one overriding fact.
The entire experiment was based on a shared point
of view, that researcher bestowed "control^^ and a focus
on Shock probability constituted a sensible do.ain
of control. Without that tacit agreement the meticu-
lously varied experimental conditions had no sense
It xs interesting to note in this regard that most
subjects utilized very instrumental and vigilant
coping styles, attending to the warning tones and
doing so more frequnetly as the effectiveness of the
avoidance button was increased by the experimenter
from 0% to 100% effective. However. 15 of the 80
subjects showed very inconsistent attention to the
warning tone, for example, attending when there was
0% or 337o effectiveness in avoidance attempts then
not attending when the avoidance button was 100%
effective. Post-experimental interviews revealed
that,
Some of these subjects evidently weretrying to demonstrate their control
over the entire situation by doing
what was counterintuitive. Others
switched coping strategies for the
sake of variety, or in order to testthe stated probabilities. (Averill
et al., 1977, p. 411)
These "inconsistent" subjects were considered "error
varience" in this research, that is their behavior
was unexplainable. It is quite possible that these
participants were those for whom the researchers ' con-
cept of "control" was not sensible or meaningful. They
looked at this relationship and perhaps other "control"
relevant relationships in their lives from another point
^ . 90or view.
There are several important points to be
.ade
about this particular experiment and others like it
First, it is quite competent and well done within the
empiricist perspective. m fact, the authors were un-
usual in their attention even to those who constituted
the "inconsistent resnonder<! " • •«i.ponaers, recognizing that some-
thing more than "error" or "random" variability might
be operating. it is most important to note the funda-
mental role of the relationship between the researcher
and researched in constituting the outcome of the study
They were in agreement (on the whole) about the legitimacy
of the relationship (researcher control)
.
and on the
sensibleness of the implicit definition of control re-
presented by the task. Without this agreement the parti-
cipants' responses degenerated into "inconsistency" or
"randomness," Moreover, the alternative concept of con-
trol, outlined above, that focuses on the experimenter-
subject relationship and a wider contextual definition
of control cannot be studied within researcher-controlled
empirical strategies. The relationship within the setting
constrained the conclusions, viewing one perspective on
control and its constitutive behavioral implications while
being totally blind to alternative conceptions. It Is
also important to recognize that it is only within a social
population where the experimenters' concepts represent
con^on sense for the majority that the professional
relationship that legitimates control can be maintained
For most, this task seemed not so outrageous as to imply
xncompetence or disrespect. Compliance with the experi-
menter would therefore seem reasonable. H.. the minority
resistence to a familiar form of nonsense simply elicited'
a passive participation and tolerance.
It is not necessary to restrict examples of re-
searcher control and professional relationship to the
extreme cases of experimental procedures in order to
illustrate inherent constraints or empirical outcomes.
A recent article by Rubin and Mitchell (1976) focused
explicitly on "Couples Research as Couples Counseling."
Although their research only exerted control through
posing researcher-selected questions and scaled-response
options (imposing units of measurement), subsequent
reports revealed strong effects as a result of their
inquiries within a legitimate professional relationship.
Couples responded in a number of ways to the researchers'
questions. Nearly 50% of those randomly sampled stated
that answering the questionnaire had affected their
relationship with their partner in one way or another.
Nearly 50% claimed no effects from their participation,
and a minority expressed offense at the form of the
questions
.
According to Rubin and Mitchell's data the
participants reported that the questionnaire the
issues raised in it, and the l:nplicit definitions
-Plied by a list of
.'important issues" affected both
the participants
"process of definition" and "dis-
closure" within couples. That i-r. .f » in IS to say, many couples
took the researchers' concepts of intimacy seriously
enough to prompt personal redefinition, discussion and
disclosure
.
Consider the role of legitimate professionalism
and compliance in shaping any conclusions from their
research. lor those who felt their relationships were
unaffected by answering the questionnaire it may be
assumed that the implicit definitions contained within
the questions were already shared (e.g., issues of
equality and relative expectations within couples) as
common-sensical, relevant and important to intimacy.
On the other hand, a minority were offended by
the form and possibly the substance of the questions.
I am no longer able to place or
determine statistical variances
on my emotional relationships.
Please don't bother me. (p. 22)
And, of course, aside from those who explicitly
expressed offense, others may be contained within
the 177o of women and 25% of the men who refused to
respond to follow-up questionnaires.
In the middle, between those who found the
questionnaire to operate within con^on sense and
reasonableness and those who were offended and felt
degraded, were a large group who had not initially
construed intimacy in the ways it was understood in
the questionnaire. They were, however, willing to
alter their definitions, engage in more disclosure,
and ultimately reshape their personal relationship
as a consequence of exposure to the researchers'
questions and concpn^c! c^rr.^ •
-iepts. Some typical comments by
respondents clearly reflect the power of asking ques-
tions within a legitimate professional relationship.
I had to think about each inherently
cryptic question. (p. 24)
.
. .
some of the questions were
really soul searching. (p. 19)
Your study did bring out a differ-
ence m our outlooks which proved
more important than I had realized
at the time. (p. 21)
Perhaps you might consider opening
a course on this idea for couples
planning marriage. It would give
you a good idea of yourself, your
compatibility with your partner,
and plans for working together on
each of your needs and finding your
goals. (p. 25)
It seems clear that the results of this survey
were necessarily constrained by the legitimacy of the
relationship between the researchers and the respondents
The findings reflect "facts" about couples who either
94
Shared the researchers perspectives on l„ti„ac, or
were willing to respond to researcher expertness on
the issues by redefining their o™ concepts of rele-
vant issues, dimensions of intimacy and the importance
of self
-disclosure. Those who found the implicit con-
cepts of Intimacy personally demeaning either rejected
the legitimacy of the researcher actively or passively
through non-response. The processes of researcher con-
trol and legitimacy, and selection of respondents who
would recognize and respond within this context necessar-
ily constrained any "facts" that could result from the
research. Once again the form of the research relation-
ship, the actions by the researchers and the perceived
legitimacy of the relationship, constituted the con-
straints on resultant conclusions about the "nature" of
intimate relationships.
Researchers may exert various forms of control
over participants to the extent that they can maintain
their positions as legitimate professionals. And main-
taining this legitimacy depends on mutual agreements
with the subjects of inquiry that they have acted with
competence, reasonableness and personal respect. Research
conclusions within such a relationship are inherently
constrained by mutual concepts of legitimacy, competence,
common-sense, and propriety. It is the general misappre-
hension of these mutually constitutive relationships within
empirical reality that has allowed researchers to re-
main unaware of their own actions in conversing and
shaping existing social constructs. But, of course
researcher relationships are not only constrained in
the acts of control described above. Alternatively
conceived, non-controlling research relationships con-
tain within them the same DotenM'^i ^r.odiiie p tial for unrecognized
researcher action.
Elements of Selection and
Acceptance: Peer Re 1 p FTTTr.
R)r a variety of reasons some social scientists
have turned away from controlled research and toward
methods variously described as ethnology, participant
observation, or qualitative observation. Typically
they choose research relationships that avoid controlling
situations and possible antecedents to behavior, avoid
controlling contexts within which observations are made,
and attempt to describe using the same units of measure-
ment and intuitive-subjective concepts that are used by
those that are the subjects of the inquiry. To the ex-
tent that research strategies may be characterized in
this way it may be said that the researcher and parti-
cipants are involved in a relationship of legitimacy
through acceptance, a relationship of peers. The re-
searcher is attempting to join the subjects of inquiry
to see the world and social experience through their eyes
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And the research can only proceed within this rela-
tionship to the extent that the observer assumes the
perspectives and points of view of those observed and
in son,e respects is accepted as an insider within their
way of life.
The principle mode of researcher action within
this strategy resides in the selection of the subjects
of inquiry. It is self-evident that in order to parti-
cipate and join in a way of construing the social world
the researcher must select and define a social aggre-
gate that is understood to be an internally coherent
entity. However, simply referring to this researcher
action as "selection," does not do justice to the com-
plexity of such an act and the ways in which selection
is both characterization and description.
In any but the most isolated societies individuals
can be characterized, and do in fact characterize them-
selves, in a variety of different ways. Individuals
who may be doctors, are also citizens, children, consumers,
democrats. Black Americans, stockholders. New Yorkers,
veterans, lovers, and so on. To select a group of "doc-
tors" or "consumers" is an act of characterization by the
researcher. And this act will constrain and define what
it means to "join" and assume the perspective of that
social group. It, of course, begs the question to ask
how the individual would characterize him/herself. Given
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persons can easily spp ^v.on,o«^ci^ii ee themselves as members of all
the groups listed above Or .'r,^,- ." . u an individual might never
characterize him/herself in a way that most ^outsiders-
would (e.g.,
..terrorists-
"guerilla-bandits
-.criminals
-traitors,.,
^degenerates..)
. which role might be a primary
self-definition depends on personal biography, historical
and cultural times, and even transitory settings (e.g.,
at home vs in the doctor's office).
So the researcher characterizes and defines a
group of individuals then attempts to establish a form
of rapport with them that will allow participation in
viewing social experience through their eyes. And con-
straints on what may be observed and the form of research
conclusions will reside in part within the complexities
of selection that define the individuals who will be
considered the participants in this social perspective.
There is, of course, a paradox existent within the acts
of selection-characterization on the one hand and the
assumed researcher relationship of participant-peer on
the other. Any reflection, explanation or description
of the population under study must inevitably take a per-
spective that justifies or explains the selection itself
from the perspective of an outsider, for those who share
some other outsider point of view. True insiders or par-
ticipants do not explain their participation in such terms
except perhaps when interacting with an outsider. A
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er
prisoner's explanation of wKy he/she is an insia..
(as i. „e.e) „iu
.a.e on a
.i„e.en.
.ex.u.e dependin,
on whether the audience is other prisoners or some groupOf sociologists. Insiders are not likel, to describe
themselves by looking through the eyes of others. They
'
are not likely to descrih» .a be their demographic make-up
social historical context or position in society as a
function of socio-economic level. These are the descrip-
tive terms, perspectives and points of view of an outsider
Moreover to fail to maintain such a perspective runs the
risk of "going native." An observer is considered to
have "gone native" at that point where s/he may begin to.-
.
. .
incorporate the role into his spI f
j-wxe, DUE rind he has so violatpH hieobserver role ^ha^ -f ? ^ i ^^^^^^^ ni-S
to rennr^ ht! ? • 5 • ^ almost impossible
f?o^^^ , findings. Consequently theield worker needs cooling-off periods
whL'h^^^' f^'' complete^arti?ipa?ion atich time he can "be himself" and look'back on his field behavior dispassionatelyand sociologically. (Gold, 1969. p . 34)
Of course,
"dispassionate" and "sociological" is exactly
what true insiders are not. At the same time this is a
necessary perspective for anyone who wishes to report
"findings."
The distinction between insider perspectives and
the point of view of outsiders reporting with access to
inside information is constituted by differences in point
of view. It can sometimes be seen by looking separately
at participant-observation field notes, reported descrip-
re-
tlons Of the experience in the role of participant
and the wider contextual perspective that describes the
research population. These th^^^ iin three elements of the research
project can chronicle i^ersion,
.'going native" and
gaining of the
"dispassionate" outsider perspective.
The field notes from Wheeler (1978) describe her
experiences working as an attendant at a large state
school for the mentally retarded. The field notes con-
tain, both in substance and linguistic style, the strong
intuitive feel of confusion, frustration, resentment and
resignation, mixed with sociological detached observation.
As the notes were transformed into a report, the topical
organization moved the impression further along the con-
tinuum toward "outsider's report from insider information."
However, the report still seemed to describe from the
attendant's perspective, interpreting incidents as they
would and focusing on those issues that attendants felt
were important, for the reasons they felt they were im-
portant. The final section of the report placed the
events and experiences within a larger societal context
of job structure, social change, economics, and ideology.
While it might be argued that this analysis was sympathetic
or even consistent with the attendants' perspective, it
nonetheless contained terms, explanations, and contextual
descriptions that were not the ways in which they would
describe themselves. Where the attendants tended to see
rs as
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problems arising fro. within the administration (its
incompetency, insenitivity
, personal idiosyncracies
etc.), the report tended to place the whole relationship
Within a social structural context. And in the end this
larger sociological perspective consumed all other,
the dominating perspective or explanation.
This description of the Wheeler report is not a
criticism. In fact, these three rather distinct points
of View may be considered the mark of competent participant
observation, maintaining the balance between "going na-
tive" and completely detached insensitivity
. The point
is, if she had assumed only the attendants' point of view,
then her descriptions and explanations would have been
constrained within that perspective. By alternatively
assuming an analysis of attendants within a sociological
perspective, other explanations and perspectives were
raised. Neither the attendant nor the sociological
description is more correct; they are two perspectives
that describe and explain in quite different ways. More-
over, they are incompatible, and imply different under-
standings of the attendant experience. It is not possible
to hold, at the same time, that the circumstances within
the work experience are caused by "incompetent adminis-
trators" who are blameworthy and that the causes lie in
the wider context of a "social structure" that creates
and maintains asylums as degrading institutions for all
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-volved. The
^^^^^^ ^^^^
U.o.,a.a,U
.Un r.ason fro. any
Researchers who select and characterise also par-
ticipate in constraining the dimensions of their con-
clusions and explanations. Abandoning the professional
relationship of highly controlled research does not
exorcise the relational quality of empirical research
It Simply alters the fonn of that relationship. Control
and compliance may no longer be at issue, but the observer
must still grapply „i,h .^e dilec^a of the insider vs
outsider relationship that is inherent in the act of
selection and characterization, m the end the researcher
must make a commitment to a coherent point of view that
will be inconsistent with other coherent perspectives
and social connnitments
.
It is quite appropriate to use
the term commitment, for as we will see later different
perspectives help constitute distinct commitments to
quite different ways of life.
Concealmen t of Intent inn. and
the Denial ot Relati^^^^^F^
Concealment and deemphasis of research intentions
plays a prominent role in both controlling and non-controlling
research strategies. Experimentalists conceal their hypo-
theses, explicit conceptions of the experimental situation
and even the identity of the interventions and measurements.
Those who attempt to assume peer-relationships may likewise
seems
Obscure or aee.phasize their perspectives, hypotheses
and the nature of their observer role. Whatever the
official reasons understood by the researcher it
to n,e that this concealment serves the purpose of ob-
scuring the full
.eaningfulness of the relationships
and the ultimate power of the researcher as scientist
to "name the reality" from his or her own perspective
Concealing or deemphasizing researcher intentions, re-
lationships, and conmitments serves to maintain the re-
searcher's legitimacy of control and/or the appearance
of participating, accepting and respecting the perspec-
tives of those being researched.
I think this point can be made most readily by
considering alternatives to some of the research cited
earlier. Consider what this research might have looked
like had the interactions with the participants been
such that the relationships between researcher and par-
ticipants was highlighted instead of concealed or deem-
phasized. In the control and shock avoidance study
(Averill et al., 1977) the experimenter might have re-
minded the subjects that while some would consider that
pushing the avoidance button when the 100% effective
signal was on would allow them to control and avoid the
shock, others might consider the fact that the researcher
could, now that they had agreed to participate, change
the conditions as he/she wished. I suspect that reorienting
subjects in this way
.i^^t have swelled the nu.he.
of those who did not respond with
"instrumental vigi-
lance" to the warning in order to push the avoidance
button. Emphasizing another view on the researcher-
subject relationship would tend to undermine the ini-
tial construal of the situation and the legitimacy of
the researcher to construe reality for the subjects.
In the Rubin and Mitchell survey of intimate
couples they asked,
yo^ a^^^'^ it is that
marry eaEir^tHiFTTtrp:^^ T.T^frl^O-lO/o through 9U-100%]. (p. 18)
This was one of those questions discussed by the authors
as stimulating discussion and disclosure, and ultimately
affecting the relationship within couples. Of course,
by asking this question the
-experts" endorsed its
importance and relevance to couple intimacy. And within
that part of the sample that accepted them as legitimate
professionals this seemed to have been an issue they
had not fully considered but were willing to consider
as relevant to defining their personal relationships.
Suppose the researchers had posed the question within
another framework: "Many noted psychologists have con-
cluded that discussions of the probability of marriage
should be avoided in intimate relationships except when
or if one member wishes to propose in definite terms.
Other experts believe it is important to discuss this
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issue early in any relationship. Given this c
troversy we invite you to skip the following question,
or answer it, as you wish " q„.T.y sft. Such a statement would
undermine the legitimacv of i-i, •n y this question for anyone
who did not already believe W i^r^r. ^y u i it important. Without
the full endorsement of the professional" it seems
likely that fewer couples would have been persuaded
to consider this an issue of importance worth discussing
And those who chose to answer the question might be quite
different from those who chose under such conditions to
agree with the "don't Dush ^ho -f,,^i: p n t e future" oriented "experts."
Finally, it is clear that Wheeler (1978) could not.
while assuming the role of an attendant, persist in de-
'
scribing the circumstances of herself and her co-workers
in social structural terms in the face of the real attend-
ants' personal, and characterological explanations. This
would have immediately identified her as an outsider, an
"intellectual type," "another kid from the college who
thinks she knows everything." To so construe the situa-
tion would be to deny the attendants' reality of "uppity
administrators,"
"insensitive superintendents." and so
on. It would have been, in a very real sense, offensive.
It seems clear that concealing researcher inten-
tions also conceals the implicit relationship of the
researcher with the subjects of inquiry. And this is,
of course, crucial for an empiricist social science which
-St only operate i„ the do.ain of facts, not agree-
-nts, behaviors, not intentions. i„ ehis regard it
xs not only important to conceal researcher intentions
and relationship issues fro™ participants who may not
Wish to hold these as legiti„.te, it is equally impor-
tant that the researcher not discover that stable and
reUable findings depend upon implicit agreements and
shared concepts. So it would be equally problematic if
subjects were to mumble during the AveriU experiment,
"sure, I agree with the experimenter" or "I'll go along
and play this little experimental reality." It was in
fact perceived as a problem when respondents informed
the researchers of how much they had altered their in-
timate relationships because of the researchers' "ex-
pertness" in asking "important" questions. These occur-
rences are seen as problems because they direct attention
to the participation of eaientiete and subjecta together
oonstruoting realities through relationships.
This would seem an appropriate time to consider
the "ultimate" strategy for avoiding the "problem of
confounding" researcher-subject relationships with "true
effects." Of course, I am referring to the completely
impersonal unobtrusive research strategy. The researcher
and the participant do not interact face to face. The
participant does not know what the researcher's intentions,
hypotheses, or measurements involve. Archival research.
106
see fo^s Of co^pletel, oBscu.ea observation, evalua-
tion research, and secondary reanal.ses, fall under this
general strategy.
It should be clear, however i-haf
,
uu , that even research
detached fron, face-to-face Interaction does not remove
the social scientist fro. his/her relationship with the
subjects of inquiry. The researcher's perspective or
po.nt of View is still contained in the dimensions of
sampling and characterization of people, situations, and
measurement indices. And the point of views expressed
through these decisions and actions place the researcher
in relationship viz-a-viz the self-perceptions and social
understanding existant with those being researched and
other concerned parties. It is through a point of view,
from one relational perspective, that the scientist
"names the reality."
The experimentalist, committed to the importance
of systematic control and "empirical validity," may select
situations that have been characterized as "serendipitous
experiments" as an opportunity for unobtrusive research.
But then s/he has the same problem as in any situation
of control. The participants in such a situation tacitly
or explicitly accept the intervention as "inescapable"
or "legitimate" within the bounds of "reasonableness."
And the observer must accept their concepts of social
reality or choose to characterize them within some other
alternative social conception. The Sherif et al
(1961) Robbers Cave Experiment ™ight be considered
unobtrusive research. The boys camp was a real situa-
tion, natural enough, and the researchers interacted
through camp personnel or in the convincing role of
camp counselors. The conclusions from this study of
cooperation and competition are nonetheless constrained
by the "legitimacy of camp personnel to unilaterally
create and define sit-iian™„l uations, segregate campers, and
define "tasks" and "crises." This research would seem
to allow generalizations to other populations of persons
who, like these children at-p tt-? n -,•^uxxa , re willing to accept such a
relationship as legitimate. The institution of the
Draft Lottery in the early 1970s would seem to have been
a terrific opportunity to examine some issues of high
and low control, with random assignment of young men to
the drafted low control or unselected high control group.
But of course such a characterization depends on the
accepted "legitimacy" of the lottery itself. Canada
and federal prisons were full of "error variance" and
"non-responders" in this regard. And conclusion would
necessarily rest on one's point of view about the con-
cept of "control." Is "allowed" control, being unselected,
the same as "seized" control, choosing to refuse the
draft. The concepts mentioned above are moral and norma-
tive and suggest different points of view and ways of
Ufe. Given perspectives shared by a group of people
constrain their options, opportunities and the di.en-
-ons Of co^non sense. Perspectives chosen researchers
l..ewise define their co™„it.ents and their understanding
of systematic" pattern, and "rando. variability."
Concealment, detachment or unobtrusiveness may
remove the researcher from personal interaction but
It does not remove him or her from standing in some re-
lationship with those being studied. In the end the
crucial issues of this relationship involve naming the
reality, and the constitution of a way of life. The
actions and decisions taken by any researcher are actions
within the framework of descriptions and characterizations
from some point of view, and face-to-face relationships
that are constituted by legitimacy within a way of life.
Social science may not then gather the social facts. Social
scientists participate in either viewing or re-viewing
social reality, and in so doing make themselves useful
within distinct points of view and social commitments.
That is to say. our actions and decisions as researchers
not only constrain the empirical conclusions but also
help define the way of life, social realities and com-
mitments within which the research may become useful.
Relationships. Common Sense
and Lfeetuiness ~
The relationships, dimensions of concepts and common
sense, and the construal of social reality that
underly social research constrain the empirical con-
to which this research may be put. The shared con-
cepts of legitimacy and con^on sense between researchers
and respondents allows systematic patterns of behavior
to be Observed. At the same time, these findings are
useful, informative and reasonable only within a way
of life that shares a similar conception of legitimacy,
common sense, and social reality.
Walton (1975) describes a highly successful pro-
ject to create a "new plant culture" in a General Foods
pet food plant using principles and theories largely
borrowed from social psychology. The project originated
from consultations with management concerned with the
problem of "employee alienation."
There were severe symptoms of employee
alienation at the existing pet foodfactory m Kankakee. Employee indif-ference and inattention while manningthe continuous-process technology ledto plant shutdowns, product waste and
costly recycling. Numerous acts of
sabotage and violence were both costlyfor the business and disintegrating
for the plant society. We wanted todesign a plant where these attitudes
states would not occur. Thus, we wanted
to avoid features of the existing plant
which promoted alienation. (p. 140)
The stated intent and theory of the "innovative" work
design was to reduce alienation and increase the workers'
sense of participation, involvement, commitment and respon-
sib.Uty
.n the work environment. This was acc,:om-
pushed, according to Walton, through the design of
the employees, relationship with tasUs
, fellow workers
and the management. Changing the relationships and
responsbilities was seen as the major cause of the
"impressive" improvement in productivity and "quality
of work life... Employees worked on whole tasks in small
groups rather than working on repetitive single tasks
on an assembly line. Assignments of individuals to sets
of tasks were subject to decisions within work teams.
Status differentiation among employees was minimized,
and dull and repetitive jobs were automated or subcon-
tracted. Visible signs of status differences between
employees and management such as separate parking lots,
separate building entrances and differences in decor
were eliminated. There were no time clocks. As many
decisions as possible were allowed to be made at the
lowest feasible level. Pay increases were geared toward
rewarding employees for mastering an increasing number
of the essential production tasks.
A somewhat different reading of Walton's descrip-
tion suggests an alternative interpretation of the inter-
vention and some noteworthy parallels between the process
of "changing", the plant culture and the process of "dis-
covery" in highly controlled research. The key elements
of similarity reside in the common and essential relationshi
and the sharing of perspectives. Although it i
lU
-s nothighlighted in his report u=,i^ ., Walton's strategy for creating
™ore productive and "less alienating" plant culture
can he seen as relying heavily on (1) selecting a popu-
at.o„ Of workers with a
.o.,.u,t.
„^
rulfillment
, control =r.A, and power, (2) conoealUg and de-
emphasizing alternative points of .leu.
Walton does note that employees were highly selected
and that this was important to the overall structure and
success of the project.
We projected evolving exDer^;.^^ ^r,e ^
orglSlat^r °^ con'-?ioAar"-ganizations. Ibr example, expecta-tions were rising with respect ?ochal-
mu?^al'?nf?'"'°""' growth, ^atte^ns^f
ment .nS ''''^ egalitarian treat-
relatinn^
openness in interpersonal
f^oJ ^ ' : • ^^^^ ^e set out to
that would be responsive to evolvingemployee expectations and would pro?vide a high quality of work life enlistunusual human involvement, and r^suUm high productivity. (p. 140)
•
. .
we used an extensive recruiting
a^d'^^f^r
^^i^h encouraged the screeningn self-selection processes to select
employees more likely to respond posi-tively to the organization we had de-
signed, (p. 141)
Therefore, an early step was for team
members to visit sites where there
were ongoing experiments with non-
conventional plant organizations and
talk with supervisory and worker par-
ticipants, (pp. 148-149)
,
11
•
.
the persons selected lr,^^system were iudffed ^ °
amenable to tht^tl a ^ Relatively
in mind (p 154^"^'^"""=^°" had
The prospective employees were selected then
for those Who would come to understand the new organ-
izational structure, and its potential for "personal
growth" and "mutual influence" frnm m,.ixu t o the same point of
view as the designer and the management. That is
workers were selected who would define the context and
dimension of "influence within small (7-17) worker
groups. Workers were selected who understood co^non
parking lots and uniform decor as
"egalitarianness"
(sic) in the work setting.
This perspective on influence and control is
roughly correspondent to the concept of control assumed
by the experimenter and most subjects in the study by
Averill et al. (1977). Control and influencability
was defined within the structure of immediate tasks
(ability to decide which of five tasks to do, probability
of avoiding shock)
.
As in the experiment some latitude
of doubt about this perspective could be overwhelmed
through the power of the relationship. For the employer
this power resided in their power to legitimately grant
or withhold a job. For the experimenter the mantle of
science lent credibility where sensibility was not im-
mediately apparent.
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s on
There are. of course, other perspective
"control,"
"innuence" and
"sclf-f.,nu..nf wHicH
represent incompatible points of view vis a vis the
•innovative., plant organization, As in the experiment
a perspective on personal control ^h.^ ^t,onur i t at focuses on the
P-....
^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
than simply the proximal outcomes would not be compati-
ble Within this work setting. What was "error variance''
or an "inconsistent responder" in the experiment becomes
an employee with a "bad attitude" within the structure
of this plant organization. The subject focuses on the
power of the experimenter to manipulate his/her experience
in the experiment- the "hari" ^mr^i ^f un bad employee focuses on the
power that still resides with the management. The fact
that they now carry a black lunch box. just like his, is
not interpreted as a consequential sign of "egalitari-
anness" or worker control within this perspective.
The management of course wished to achieve not
just "significantly different" results; they wanted to
increase productivity and enlarge their profits. They
could not simply rely on random sampling to select a
group that was predominantly consistent with their per-
spective. So they carefully selected. Moreover, the
plant was not a short-term experiment; it was a long-
term enterprise, and they needed to insure that the
necessary agreements in perspective that supported the
higher productivity persisted. To
.ake matters worse
there is a highly organized body of wor.ers that espouse
an alternative point of view. Uhor unions are notoriously
hostile to the perspective that control is defined by
"allowed control- and "management benevolence." The an-
swer to this problem in the Walton project appears only
once, buried in a nine-column table under "Favorable
Business Conditions" necessary for success.
No power groups will exist withinthe organization that create anant 1
-management posture. (p. 152)
It is perhaps not surprising that research conducted
within the relationship of legitimate professionalism,
control and compliance, and shared perspective contains
some striking resemblance to other conerns in the wider
society. In both cases the interests of the controllers
are best served by manipulating implicit agreements about
social concepts. The scientist can maintain the illusion
of "accruing facts" detached from human relationships.
The businessman can maintain control and power by oper-
ating within a social reality that conceals alternatives
to the status quo. Stability and continuity in business
practices and the body of knowledge both depend on the
understanding that these social agreements are the "nature
of things. "
The congruity between current conceptions of
social science and the range of usefulness is not limited
-ons
.ems
to circumstances that are so clearly related to
issues of control. m recent years Jacobo Varela
has gained some notoriety through his applicatic
of social psychological theory to "social probl
Appropriately enough, he describes his methods of
application as "Social Technology- (1977, 1975, 1971).
%rela is very explicit about the fact that
his concept of social intervention is directly tied
to and an extension of the experimental paradigm.
It has often been remarked that one
sciences
nh.^c- ^^^^ ^^^^^ t° follow thephysical sciences too slavishly. Mycontention is that they have not fol-lowed them enough. (p. 915^ 1977)
To follow the physcial sciences more slavishly is to
strive for power over "variables," controlled manipu-
lation of procedures, and the achievement of predict-
able behavior. Indeed, "social technology" seems an
apt characterization for the extension of this approach
to applied social issues.
The social technological approach is illustrated
easily through the case study of a young woman who
turned to alcohol and marijuana after her rejection
by an art school admissions committee.
Beatrice (Rosa's friend) easily diag-
nosed Rosa's abuse of alcohol and
drugs as coinciding with a curt re-jection note she received to her ap-
plication for eagerly sought admission
to an art school. The shock of re-
jection was interpreted by Rosa as
a rejection of her artistic values
and abilities. (p. 916)
116Wla goes on to describe Rosa^s dimcuUies in
ter^s of an approach-avoidance proble. concerning
the desire to pursue art and the fear of further
rejection. He chose to assist Beatrice in an atti-
tude change intervention to return Rosa to her pre-
vious involvement in art- tu •m t. This was expected to con-
flict With and reduce her abusive indulgence in al-
cohol and drugs. The intervention carried out by
"""'^ and Beatrice was described in terms of Sherif
and Hovland (1961) latitude of rejection scales
Likert ratings (1932). cognitive dissonance (Pestin-
ger, 1957) and reactance theory (Brehm, 1966).
The manipulation involved Beatrice engaging
Rosa in an orchestrated conversation (unknown to
Rosa, of course) using various verbal ploys to in-
duce her to assert increasingly positive statements
consistent with resuming her art work. By first
eliciting verbal commitment to the least negatively
valenced statement (rated by Beatrice as something
Rosa would not initially endorse) and moving slowly
towards statements more consonant with resuming art
work, Rosa would change her attitude and the inter-
vention would succeed. Beatrice's rating of state-
ments which Rosa would and would not initially agree
with and the progression of orchestrated conversation
are listed below.
Likert
Statement Attitude
.^^^^r
_
Rating
1
2
3
4
+8
-1
-2
-3
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Statement
I've always loved art.
L'^^'^.J^^^'^ followingmy mother's advice when shedisapproved of my painting.
There are always obstaclesm the lives of artists.
Artists should not necessarily
tollow the dictates of the
critics
.
Art school staff do not have
the time nor are they infalli-
ble m judging applicant port-folios.
^ School's opinion is
7 -6
^
-j^ j.i. a.vjn X£)just one more negative opinion
that most artists face.
8 -7
9 -8
I think I'll reapply for next
term.
I'll send them some of my new
art
.
Give me materials. I'm starting
to paint now. (Varela, 1977
p. 917)
According to Varela 's report, Beatrice was highly
successful in manipulating Rosa to make these successive
assertions and in encouraging Rosa to resume her art work
Quoting Beatrice,
She worked all afternoon, thoroughly im-
mersed in the feelings of the beings
in her drawings
. More and more of the
old enthusiasm returned. At one point
she looked at herself surrounded by the
materials and new creations and said:
"This isn't what we had planned for the
afternoon. What did you do to me?" I
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^reU describes
,he success of his technological"
intervention:
i£-"---"-"'^-n^th:f-.^^^drawings, gone on two photoeraDhv ^^?T.c
aband ^T^?^'^^ ^^^^ slJ^^rvTr^tLur^"
o1SfiS^l^^^^^%\-^ --P^ so^^al
Indeed, Varela did recreate the essential elements
of the experimental and controlled methodology in this
applied situation. All the elements seem to be present.
Beatrice, a trusted friend and legitimately powerful per-
son with Rosa, clearly and accurately assessed Rosa's
social reality and perspective on her art school rejec-
tion. The underlying perspective shared by Beatrice and
Rosa comes out clearest in the scaled Likert statements.
Despite some intermediate protestations to the contrary
(statements 4. 5, 6 and even those equivocate) the bottom-
line reality for Rosa was that the opinion and endorsement
of the art school was an important indication of her com-
petence as an artist and her personal worthiness. State-
ments 7. 8, and 9 reassert that the important issue is
to "get back to work" so next time with "new art work"
she will be "up to standards." \arela reaffirms this
perspective by the importance he places on reappli-
cation as an index of success with Rosa.
But, of course, therp a-ro
,
n e re alternative perspectives
that could be taken. There are other resolutions, from
other points of view, that could allow Rosa to return
to her loved art work, discontinue her abuse of drugs
and resolve her self-doubt: refocusing on her personal
satisfaction gained from artistic activities, a rejection
of the legitimacy of the school's opinions, disconnecting
others' opinions of her artistic talents from her assess-
ment of self-worth, and so on. But, of course, in these
cases, involving more fundamental changes, the social
psychological literature is not so informative and the
implicit goal of rapid return to the status quo is vio-
lated. These alternatives remained invisible partly
because they were concealed behind the tacit agreements
about social reality, and the belief that the way things
are is the way things must be, all this shared by %rela,
Beatrice and Rosa.
It is clear that fundamental tacit agreements
play an important role within relationships of control
and compliance. In the experiment, the factory, and
the intimate relationship agreements about the legitimacy
of the power-compliance relationship (expert, financial,
affectual) and the commonsensical nature of shared points
of view helped conceal any fundamental alternatives. But
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it is also true that fundamental commitments to a
social perspective operate outside of power-compliance
relationships, even outside of face to face interactions
altogether. As discussed earlier (Chapter II) commit-
ments to a point of view may become invisible by virtue
of their very ubiquitousness
. Our socially constructed
concepts become the "nature of things" because they help
constitute our personal lives and make sense of the wider
social milieu. Be that as it may, these perspectives are
elements of social commitment and they do constrain the
ways in which we understand the world. It is because
we hold these perspectives as internalized reality that
they may become invisible. And it is this fact that
underlies the actions and decisions of ethnological and
participant observation techniques, and the acceptance-
peer relationships they attempt to assume. VJhether an
observer accepts the "reality" of those observed or
subsumes this reality within a wider contextual analysis
the empirical conclusions will be constrained by the
inherent researcher decisions and perspectives. And
whatever relationship is assumed, the point of view
will constrain the real world actions and uses that
are reasonable within it.
The bottom line of any description and character-
ization can be understood as "naming the reality." And
some current literature offers very dramatic illustrations
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of the ways described realities fit within some com-
mitments and not others, within some ways of life but
not others. Ian Lubec (1977a, 1977b) offers an example
of alternative conceptions of "aggression" and their
imbeddedness in contrasting world views. The central
themes revolve around the criteria and dimensions of
human action that define violence and aggression and
the interpretive values placed on these acts. It is
clear for example that most social psychological re-
search and common conceptions of violence are understood
within an interpersonal and dyadic context. Violent
acts include hitting, shooting, shocking, etc. Partly
because of some methodological traditions and partly
because of widely held implicit understandings, other
activities that might be considered aggressive and
violent are not easily included within theoretical and
empirical frameworks: polluting, job termination,
discriminatory hiring and firing, I.Q. testing, deameaning
media characterization of ethnic groups, etc. It is
clear, however, that within another framework these
less direct, but nonetheless consequential, actions
could be considered acts of extreme violence and aggres-
sion. Then, of course, if one assumes this point of
view a number of other concepts must be readjusted.
What is the evaluation now of sabotage by individuals
who have been "aggressed" against? What is the punishment
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for discriminatory hiring which relegates minorities
to positions of joblessness and poverty? Should capital
punishment be considered as an appropriate punishment
for premeditated pollution, and so on?
Lubec also points out that when violence and
aggression are understood within a dyadic perspective
and the definition is restricted to immediate and direct
actions it seems more reasonable to place a negative value
on all such acts. This negative valuation and a focus
on reducing aggression has characterized most theorizing
in social psychology. However, there are other perspec-
tives. The largely ignored work of Sorel (1908) took
a wider view on the definition of aggression and conse-
quently placed a different value on some violent actions.
To the point, Sorel considered violence on the part of
oppressed groups to be both natural and understandable
in the face of long suffered conditions and preceding
acts of violence perpetrated by ruling classes.
Sorel 's approach held that violence
was functional, good, a normal part
of the socio-political process of
antagonistic class conflict, and
should be encouraged in heroic, apo-
calyptic struggles. (Lubec, 1977b, p. 1)
The point here, of course, is not to endorse one
point of view or the other. Rather, it is most impor-
tant to recognize that these two perspectives on aggres-
sion and violence, (1) represent two different and in-
compatible perspectives, (2) each perspective constrains
the holders' understanding of the social world, (3)
each understanding of the social world carries
within it implied actions and activities with real
world consequences, and (4) in so far as one is
committed to a perspective s/he is also committed to
a way of life.
Other commentaries illustrate these same points
considering other phenomena. Ryan's (1972) discussion
of the implicit perspective of "Blaming the Victim-
traced the relationship of "person centered" explana-
tions to social programs that maintain poverty while
appearing to support reform. Priere (1970) discussed
the ways in which the oppressed poor have been led to
maintain their positions as underdogs by their tacit
acceptance of the wider society's concepts and explan-
ations of their condition. A recent review of the
literature on Black and white doll preference among
Black children (Banks, 1976) supported conclusions
that suggested "white child ethnocentrism" as a rea-
sonable reinterpretation of data that had been used
to argue that Black children maintained a "poor self
image." The widely held interpretation was part of
the support for the degrading concept of Black children
as living in "cultural deprivation." Lobov (1969)
studying the verbal abilities of Black ghetto children
made a similar point from researching speech patterns
within a different empirical relationship.
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It is not necessary at this point to continue
the chronicling of research relationships and per-
spectives that help constitute empirical conclusions.
The point I wish to make here is a more general one.
Within our empirical techniques, the activities of
inquiry, are contained the perspectives that constrain
conclusion and interpretations. And these constraints
and commitments are also part of our commitments to
a way of life and a view of social reality. Most
important perhaps, is the understanding that these
commitments and their implications cannot be reduced
to "empirical questions." Ibr example, in the case
of "concepts of control" one perspective is "better"
than the other depending on one's commitments to a
way of life. The men and wom.en in the factory, under-
standing control within a very local framework, were
reported to be very pleased with the quality of their
work life. To adopt a point of view that understood
themselves as powerless vis a vis the management would
involve personal costs and benefits and could only be
weighed according to values and commitments about how
they wished to live. They could lose their jobs; but
they could also gain a fellowship with a larger group
of organized workers. They could lose an opportunity
to work in pleasant surroundings under conditions of
"powerlessness" on the chance, in the long run, of
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establishing truly
"egalitarion" relationships of
worker and management negotiated work conditions.
These are conflicts about what one values, how one
wants to live, and commitments to the integrity of
world views. These are not empirical questions.
Clearly, a similar analysis is possible for Rosa and
others
.
Social scientists have become so absorbed in
the pursuit of "facts," "validity" and the use of
"methodological tools" of discovery that they have
lost sight of their participations in a social reality.
This understanding of the enterprise has obscured the
ways in which particular perspectives have been reified
and conserved as if they were the nature of things.
This conservatism is reflected in the potential use of
"scientific" methods and theories in applied settings.
Coming to an understanding of the ways in which a social
scientist must necessarily participate in a set of
perspectives and commitments within the context of em-
pirical relationships casts the social scientific enter-
prise in an entirely different light.
If it is considered essential that researchers
report sampling procedures, sample sizes, statistical
analyses, measurement procedure and so on, then it would
seem at least equally important that scientists attempt
to explicate the dimensions of social perspectives that
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also define and constrain the meaningfulness of their
data. "Rigorous." "legitimate," and "competent" science
then could be redefined to require this form of self-
reflection and self
-consciousness. I am speaking, of
course, of social scientists and the social scientific
enterprise in general taking responsibility for actions
and decisions that reflect social commitments.
I have argued for a reorientation, turning from
the aspirations of empiricism, facts, and validity to
the pursuit of self
-consciousness and good faith in
social scientific inquiry. In so doing it is clear that
I have dwelt more on anomalies, problems, and contradic-
tions than I have on solutions. And indeed, the ideal
of pursuing self
-consciousness in social science does
raise more problems and questions than it does ready
solutions. Eindamental assumptions and perspectives
tend to be difficult to bring into awareness. They exist
like the air; it is everywhere and therefore invisible.
Or our perspectives and social realities are so private
that they never see the light of day and therefore do
not encounter existent contradictions, with their po-
tential for raising consciousness about alternatives.
I will not resolve these dilemmas. I can only suggest
some activities of inquiry that would seem consistent
with this new empirical enterprise. In the next Chapter
I will discuss the relationship of self-consciousness
to the concept of good faith in social science.
CHAPTER V
GOOD FAITH SOCIAL SCIENCE: FROM
PRIESTHOOD TO POLITICS
In the preceding chapters I have considered empirical
methods as researcher actions and researcher shaped re-
lationships with the subjects of inquiry. I have argued
that such a view of empirical methods refocuses attention
on the ways that empirical conclusions are constrained
by the perspectives of the researcher and the implicit
agreements within empirical relationships. Given this
analysis I would like to suggest the beginnings of an
enterprise for the social sciences that can transcend the
limitations of empiricism.
The mechanical rules of "objective science" have
obscured the participatory role of scientists in their
relationships with those studied and the society that
might put their theories and interpretations to practical
use. The alternative to this orientation focuses not
on "facts" but "perspectives" and replaces the aspirations
of "validity" with the goals of "social responsibility."
While I would not pretend to define an alternative science
it is possible to suggest the outlines of this alternative.
A participatory science can no longer stand aloof as the
priesthood of objectivity. It must face the challenges
127
of participation in good faith. And in so far as the
coins of controversy are the commitments to ways of
life and human values, participation will necessarily
take the form of politics.
Good Faith Social Science
The relational qualities of social inquiry have
been obscured by the long standing focus on empirical
methods as "tools" for establishing "social facts."
Empirical strategies have been applied and understood
as independent of the researcher and the researched.
And this view has allowed the socially legitimated re-
lationships and implicit agreements that support the
researcher-participant interactions to remain invisible
constituents of scientific results, conclusions and
interpretations. These social relationships, based on
the currency of legitimate agreements and invisible
alternatives, have been reified as truths and basic
knowledge. Social science has not come to grips with
the inherently participatory nature of social reality
and its constitutive empirical regularities. Because
social scientists have not recognized their own partici
pation, because social facts have been construed as
separate and detached, empirical social inquiry has
tended to sanctify the status quo, to conserve and
anoint existant social reality as the "natural order."
-ence
Many of the concepts addressed by social sci,
are essentially contestable. However, to the extent
that normative social concepts are understood as social
facts they may remain uncontested. Concepts of "control
and personal influence,"
"aggression and violence."
"mental health," "sex roles." "social power." and "com-
pliance" may be socially defined and understood in a
variety of ways. To the extent that social scientists
focus on the behavioral regularities of existent concep-
tions and reify these empirical regularities as social
facts, then they participate in a set of conservative
commitments
.
The behavioral regularities of subjects under
varying conditions of "potential control" as they emerged
from the relationships within the Averill et al
. study
(1977)
,
and the "successful" restructuring of a plant
society by Walton and his managerial colleagues do not
reflect the facts and applications of "control" and be-
havioral response, but rather the limits of instrumental
action within existent social concepts. Those with al-
ternative understandings of control and personal influ-
ence that did not fit within the conceptual status quo
were viewed as "inconsistent responders" and "employees
with bad attitudes," respectively. Empirical research
that defined aggression and violence in interpersonal
and dyadic terms finds behavioral regularities among
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the majority of participants who share thi:
-s view.
More detached and indirect forms of aggression remain
uninvestigated and excluded from the currently held
concepts of violence. Those who recognize the "reality"
of remote aggression and respond with counter-aggression
are understood in normative terms as "deviants." "abnormal,
and within the current conceptions, "irrational." The
forms of rational and normative real world responses
within this view are obvious; they are equally obviously
defined by the normative legitimate reality, not by the
"facts."
Social scientific inquiry does not have access to
the "facts," only to various social conceptions and their
constuitive actions and behaviors. Because this has not
been well understood the interpretations of empirical
inquiry have been limited by the study of random samples
and the normative realities shared by the majority of
those sampled. Perhaps unwittingly, this form of
research, with its dependence on criteria of validity
associated with "means and central tendencies." has
tended to identify and theorize within the domain of
a normative conceptual reality. If a social science
of facts is impossible, an "unwitting" social science
is certainly unacceptable. Any alternative must include
some understanding of its participation and implication
within the social commitments that are also the subject
of inquiry. A legitimate social science must pursue
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self-consciousness and explicitness about these com-
mitments that help constrain empirical results and
interpretations. The pursuit of such self
-consciousness
can be the foundation of a social science in Good Faith.
The central aspirations of a good faith social
science revolves around issues of self
-consciousness
.
If socially defined concepts help constitute social
realities they cannot be bannished from social inquiry.
And if social scientists, like everyone else, must view
social phenomena from within a point of view then they
are necessarily participants as well as observers.
The difficulty of the enterprise becomes
more apparent when I realize that my
perspective itself has emerged out of
my personal history of social trans-
actions. I share it with selected
others with whom I interact, and its
structure helps to constitute the
fabric of our relationships. These
others are the ones I habitually turn to
to check the adequacy of my concepts,
the plausibility of my beliefs, the
propriety of my values. And yet, since
our shared perspective has developed
out of shared social experiences, my
habitual procedure hardly encourages
the self
-consciousness I need to deve-
lop. (Connolly, 1973, p. 27)
Facing the problems and challenges of explicating these
social perspectives as they define the constraints,
meaningfulness
, and uses of empirically derived results
and interpretations will be the measure of good faith
for social scientific enterprises within a wider societal
context.
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Self-consciousness will not be fully achieved
through simple admonitions to "know thyself," or well
intentioned researcher introspection. Awareness of
fundamental social agreements and perspectives that
constitute commitments to a way of life are revealed
through their confrontation with alternative perspec-
tives and commitments
.
By confronting unfamiliar presumptionsm opposing theories I am able to render
my own tacit views more explicit. By
striving to perceive the world from other
angles of vision" I begin to grasp more
explicitly the habits of classification
I employ. I begin to see that my disagree-
ments with others do not only or always
constitute simple disagreements of fact;
they also reflect a variable weighting
of the "same facts" and subtle differ-
ences in the way we slice and organize
experience. The suggested approach
and promised results of this enterprise
are lucidly summarized by Stuart Hampshire:
The habits of self-conscious criticism
may modify the habits of behavior. But
the habits of criticism are themselves
only revised by further criticism and
comparison, and by communication with
minds that are outside the circle of
convention and custom within which he
is confined. (Connolly, 1973, p. 27
and Hampshire, 1959, p. 208)
Ian Lubek's (1977a, 1977b) analysis of social psycholog-
ical approaches to aggression research revealed the limits
of the concepts by posing alternative definitions with
their own internal rationale and social perspective.
Sampson (1977) traced the underlying commitments to
"self-sufficient individualism" in American psychological
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research by posing alternative values that suggested
alternate conceptions of "mental health," and "sex
roles." and the possibility of other socially legitimate
realities. When alternatives such as these are raised
they suggest another way of life and a different set
of commitments for empirical researchers.
A social science in good faith must embrace crit-
icisms and discourses such as those noted above as an
integval part of the smpirioal enterprise. Such critiques
are not ancillary, nor are they simply interesting his-
torical footnotes; they represent disputes about the
meanings and social uses of empirical research and social
commitments. Clearly, suggestions that research on "con-
trol and social influence" has restricted its conceptions
to current normative social understandings constitutes
a challenge to the legitimacy of the concept and the
legitimacy of the way of life that is constrained by it.
Similarly, any analysis of fundamental conceptions and
their representations within social research raises the
possibility of alternatives and the possibility of other
legitimate commitments. Such disputes about legitimacy
and social commitment are not empirical disputes in the
traditional sense. These disputes are essentially polit-
ical
.
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From Priesthood to Politics
The social scientific aspirations of "objective
fact" and "basic knowledge" have allowed social scien-
tists to engage in social relations as members of a
priesthood. These objectives have been seen as trans-
cendant over other human enterprises, ultimately good
for all. This priestly position has fashioned the form
and substance of discourse and dispute. When the aspir-
ation is to seek "truth" then the alternative must be
seen as "ignorance." "Scientific methods" are understood
as the tools for gathering facts and all facts are seen
as valuable elements of knowledge, part of the "natural
order." Base human values and issues of political rele-
vance are thought to reside only in "the uses of knowledge,"
a matter quite apart from science. Human values that
have been seen to invade activities of the priesthood
have been addressed as alien bodies from the human realm,
to be exorcised from the ritual and the sanctity of the
temple. In this way the priesthood of science has es-
tablished the legitimacy of its activities through a
marriage with the ideals and aspirations of the enter-
prise. And by tying the human activity of social research
to the ideals of truth, the disputes and discourse about
legitimate activity have been truncated and limited in
scope
.
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It is clear by now that this priesthood, like
others, is intimately involved in issues of human
value. It is clear that the activities of empirical
research are constituted by human perspectives, and
connnitments to particular ways of life. And the ideals
of "truth- and "knowledge" that have exempted these
activities from scrutiny by the unanointed nonscientist
have only served to conceal their participation in the
negotiation of social realities.
In the last chapter, I illustrated the ways in
which research relationships, the understanding of social
concepts and the potential uses of research findings
are mutually constituted. Moreover, the social commit-
ments that are represented within these relationships
are essentially contestable. They may represent ways
of life that from another point of view are seen to be
oppressive or otherwise unacceptable. The contests
that must be engaged are not contests about facts; social
facts reside within a way of life. The contests are about
the preferred structure of social relationships themselves
Such disputes are inherently political. Insofar as the
social scientific enterprise is implicated within these
disputes, participation in good faith will require social
scientists to face unsettling questions concerning social
responsibility, the limits of legitimate scientific
activity, censorship, and political action.
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Because social perspectives help constitute
ways of life, the connnitments within social scientific
research are potentially implicated in wider social
disputes. It would not seem reasonable to expect labor
unionists to show great enthusiasm for social research
which conceives of "control and influence" within a
definitional framework of "asymetrical legitimate power"
and "allowed choices and options." Such an understanding
generates information about the manipulability of indiv-
iduals within this limited conception, instrumental re-
sponses that can be elicited under the "illusion of
control," and so on. Research of this sort allows con-
sultants such as Walton to describe his factory work-
place interventions as "applied social psychology" as
the application of "basic knowledge." Many people under-
stand themselves to be victims of "institutional aggression
and violence." Such an understanding may allow sabotage,
theft, and revolt as reasonable defensive measures against
such societal oppression. Why should such persons from
the classes of the oppressed support research which de-
fines aggression in individualistic terms suggesting so-
cietal interventions to "ameliorate" individual aggression?
Within this conception they will be understood as abnormal,
sick, maladjusted, and deviant. Attention is focused on
their "aggressiveness" outside of the context of their
victimization. These disagreements represent political
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disagreements and political negotiations and solutions
are suggested. Such political disputes have already
resulted in confrontations concerning Arthur Jensen's
work on intelligence and race (Jensen. 1969; Block and
Dworkin. 1976) and testing in general. I believe that
there are other traditions of research, such as those
mentioned above, that are no less politically relevant.
They have escaped dispute to the degree that their in-
herent commitments and particular applications have
remained concealed and misapprehended as "basic and
applied knowledge."
The political complexities of a social scientific
enterprise may be most like those of the news media in
a democractic society. The news media also have the
problem of reporting from a point of view, of selecting
"newsworthy" stories, asking "revealing" questions,
using "responsibility" in their choice of stories to
run, etc. The perspectives, descriptive terms, and
social concepts used by news reporters are also essen-
tially contestable. A comparison of news reporting across
papers {flew York Times, Rolling Stone, Pravda, The Real
Paper in Boston, etc.) clearly reveals the difference
in perspectives, and commitment to ways of life that are
reflected in what stories are considered important and
what the "facts" are seen to be. And, of course, the
iiews media are completely enmeshed in the political
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process; they have been seen as the
-watchdogs of
government."
"responsible informants for society,"
"tools of Wallstreet,"
"supporters of an illegal war ,
"
and so on. And both the public at large and machinery
of government have been engaged in conflict over the
appropriate activities and roles of news reporting in
a democratic society: can a reporter protect his/her
sources; should they be prosecuted for receiving class-
ified information; when may they be sued for liable or
false reporting; how does the public respond to "irre-
sponsible" reporting, political bias. etc. Newspersons
like scientists claim to report only the "facts." I
would suggest that "scientific facts" are subject to
the same problems as "newsfacts." Moreover, it would
seem reasonable to place "scientific facts" within the
same discourse of societal considerations that has
constituted our perennial attempts to define the proper
relationship of the news media and the democratic process.
When newspaper chains become too large and hold
too large a monopoly there is fear of "one-sided reporting"
and consideration of forcing the sale of some papers.
When newspapers are viewed as "irresponsible" there is
discussion of censorship, as in the case of reportage
on terrorism, hijackings, etc. The public's confidence
waxes and wanes as papers are perceived as biased or
unfair (consider the changes in opinions about the
Washington Post from the time of the first Watergate
stories to the announcement by President Ibrd that
he wished to "restore confidence in government")
.
I do not wish to characterize the news media in
America as having achieved a state of "balanced" re-
porting and "objectivity" by virtue of its participation
in the political process. But I would suggest that the
questions that are relevant for the enterprise of gen-
erating "newsfacts" are also relevant for the enterprise
of generating "science facts." The scientific enterprise
too can indulge in "irresponsible" or "unacceptable"
activities. Editorial policies can be viewed as ideo-
logically biased and as a threat to "the people's right
to know" from some alternative point of view. It be-
comes legitimate to reconsider the relationships of
"basic researchers" with the uses of their research in
consulting. To whom is the research useful, and whose
interests are served? Should tax money be spent on
research which is viewed as perpetuating social concepts
contributive to the existing class structure, and so on?
Raising the inherent political issues that consti-
tute the social scientific enterprise is indeed an un-
settling business. It raises the specter of the full
range of political actions: ideologically informed fundin
decisions, editorial policies and hiring policies, social
ridicule, censorship, etc. These are actions and issues
IS
con-
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that have traditionally been seen as anathema to the
social scientific enterprise. I would only suggest
that they have by tradition remained implicit, not
absent. The description of politics in science ha^
been undertaken by others, including pressures to
form in research style (especially highly controlled
experimentation in social psychology)
.
choice of
publication outlet, and fund raising from available
granting sources (Lubec. 1977; Bevan, 1970; Greenberg,
1977; and others in Lubec). Social scientists have
served the interests of business (Baritz, 1960) and
advertising (Ewen, 1976), with more interest in selling
than consumer protection, more interest in production
than worker rights. By raising the political issues
and commitments to the level of explicit discourse,
science may run the risk of more extreme forms of dis-
pute and conflict. But then the alternative to con-
flict must be resignation or obfuscation.
The priesthood of science has created the illusion
of detachment in an "ivory tower" of pure knowledge.
As social scientists begin to reexamine and debate the
social commitments inherent in their research relation-
ships and theoretical formulations this illusion of de-
tachment will dissolve. I have suggested elsewhere that
the focus on "methods as tools" has led to the unwitting
support of existant social perspectives and the conserva-
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tion of existant social relationships. This is, of
course, not a new idea. Kvale (1973) has discussed
the ways in which behaviorism serves the purposes of
maintaining relationships within a highly technological •
and industrial state. Friere (1970) has argued that
existant social understandings have helped maintain
the poor and oppressed classes in a state of hopeless-
ness and noncompetition with ruling classes. Person-
centered explanations (Ryan. 1971) and humanistic psy-
chology (Ratner, 1971) have been viewed as liberal social
ideology in the service of existant class structure and
the diversion of attention from the possibility of more
radical explanations and prescriptions. There have,
of course, been others who have made the same point:
under the guise of objectivity, social scientific
findings have tended to lend support and legitimacy
to the conservation of existant social arrangements.
And those who have vested interests in such conservatism
have found empiricist social science to be a comfortable
companion
.
It should be clear that raising the level of dis-
course in social science, questioning the commitments,
uses, and perspectives of research relationships and
conclusions will inevitably place the discussants in a
more adversarial posture vis a vis existant power holders
in society. Paulo Friere was exiled from Brazil for his
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efforts in helping the poor liberate themselves from
their docile acceptance of degrading self
-definitions
and social agreements about the inevitability of their
class position. Walton was hired to increase production;
he would not have been retained to "raise consciousness"
among workers. Social scientists who discuss and legi-
timize social concepts that might threaten the existant
social order should expect to see their stock drop with
those invested in the status quo. The empiricists'
implicit reification of the social order as the "nature
of things" is well suited to those whose power and profits
rely on existant. often implicit, social agreements.
Self
-consciousness about social commitments, essential
to a good-faith social science, will suggest alternative
arrangements and the possibility of social changes that
may alter the distribution of influence and power. This
discourse will serve to heat up the public debate, bring
the legitimacy of the social scientific enterprise into
question, and in general make life a good deal more prob-
lematic for social scientists.
I will not presume to answer the serious questions
I have raised about the legitimacy of various social
scientific concepts and relationships in the research
enterprise. That is not to say I have no opinion. How-
ever, I do have less faith in moralizing than in the po-
tential of a more moral way of life. That is to say, I
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would prefer to focus, for the moment, on the broader
issues. If social science is to participate in good
faith within a society, then it is imperative that we
go beyond the discussion of validity and inference
to face the real issues and political realities of
our enterprise. The discourse on social responsibility,
legitimacy, obligation, academic freedom, public access
and so on belongs in the political arena, not in the
false sanctity of the temple of science.
Good Faith Social Science and
the Activity of inquiry
I have argued throughout this dissertation that
the enterprise of social science should be understood
within the fabric of wider social commitments. The
research questions that are asked, the relationships
within the investigative activity, methodological actions
and decisions, the self-images of those in the social
scientific enterprise and the dimensions of existant
social realities are all internally related. That is
to say, social scientists and the profession of social
science are full participants in the negotiations and
renegotiations that help constitute social ways of life.
From this point of view the most important issues facing
individual scientists and the profession concern the
fashioning of our own way of life. I have proposed that
the aspirations of social science be turned toward the
pursuit of self -consciousness and the open negotiation
of social reality. I have proposed a Good Faith
Social Science.
T^is argument has attempted to re-view the activ-
ities of inquiry, and in the process arrive at a new
understanding of rigorous social science and social re-
sponsibility. Within the present perspective these two
concepts merge. Rigorous science must attempt to ex-
plicate the constituent social commitments that define
the meaningfulness of conclusions and interpretations.
Moreover, such self
-consciousness emerges from open
critique and discourse between those who identify with
discrepant and conflicting points of view. Consciousness
raising occurs when the rationality and self-interests
of one perspective are confronted with allegations of
irrationality and perhaps illegitamacy from some other
point of view. The process by which self-consciousness
is pursued also becomes the process of open negotiation
and social responsibility. Social responsibility then
is no longer understood as the activity of social scien-
tists when they are being "good citizens." Theoretical
self-consciousness and social responsibility merge within
the concept of rigorous social science and the social
scientific way of life.
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Postscript
I began this dissertation by referring to a
sense of crisis in social psychology and other social
scientific endeavors. I have focused attention on the
ways in which philosophical empiricism, as it is under-
stood in the social sciences, has alienated researchers
from their inherent embeddedness in social life. I
have addressed both the crisis and the potentials for
resolving this crisis by arguing for the commonality
of social science with other social ways of life. For
social scientists as well as others, we are at the same
time recipients, actors, and inquirers within our ex-
isting social reality. No amount of mental or methodo-
logical gymnastics will allow us to escape this essential
human condition. I have argued that an understanding of
the ways in which social scientists share this condition
sheds light on the nature of the current crisis of con-
fidence and at the same time suggests the directions
for an alternative social scientific enterprise. Em-
pirical researchers must come to grips with the realities
of the participant- inquirer role, a role in which rigorous
research, theoretical self
-consciousness
.
political con-
flict, and social responsibility tend to merge into what
I have called "good faith social science."
By focusing on be basic issues of the commonality
of social science and social life other relevant concerns
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have not been addressed. If social research may not
be independent of the social-historical context in
which it occurs, is it also true that social research
may not be distinguished from other social enterprises?
Does social scientific research contain any fundamentally
different characteristics that distinguish it from news
reporting, literature, or political advocacy? What
claims can be made for the character of systematic em-
pirical inquiry? I have not addressed these issues.
Reestablishing social science as an inherently social
activity loomed increasingly larger and as logically prior
to these questions. I must admit that at this point the
distinctions between social scientific inquiry, news-
reporting, literature, politics, and so on seem relatively
trivial to me in the face of their essential commonalities,
Be that as it may, I believe that consideration of the
possible distinctions [i.e., scientific methods] would
appear to be a reasonable pursuit given the groundwork
laid in the present discussion. However, if such dis-
tinctions are to be made, if social science is to lay
claim to special achievements or potentialities, then
these claims of distinction must reside within a recog-
nition that social inquiry is a fundamentally human social
activity.
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